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"Personsattempting tofind a notive in this narrativewill be prosecuted; personsattempting
to find a moral in it will be banished; persons attempting to find a plot in it will be shot.
By order of the author[s]
Per G. G., Chief of Ordnance"T

THE

Contract Settlement Act of 1944 was designed to insure
speedy, fair, and final settlement of terminated war contracts.'
Proponents of the legislation recognized that the streamlined
settlement-by-negotiation procedure which it authorized would sacrifice
meticulous accuracy to speed and on occasions leave loose ends temporarily unsettled. At this writing-two months after V-J Day and five months
after V-E Day-there is almost universal concurrence that the standard
settlement procedure prescribed under the act has attained the basic objectives of speed and fairness, and it is generally believed that finality of
settlement likewise has been gained. A review of executed termination
settlement agreements, however, indicates that their finality frequently
is limited by reservations and exceptions to the mutual release of rights
and obligations under the terminated contracts. Moreover, a termination
settlement agreement is itself a contract that may embody unsettled rights
and obligations which, in effect, merely replace those under the terminated contract. In this article it is proposed to analyze the nature and con* Assistant Chief, Legal Division, and Member of Settlement Review Board, Chicago
Ordnance District.
t Attorney, Legal Division, Chicago Ordnance District.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors. They are not to be taken
as representing War Department policy.
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sequences of the more common of these loose ends-ends which may require considerable attention by both the contractor and the Government
before their contractual relationship, in fact, is finally closed.
The observations contained in this article are based upon the experiences of one of the largest wartime procurement installations in the country, the Chicago Ordnance District. Approximately one-thirtieth of all
Government war expenditures were made through this office. At the end
of hostilities it was administering over 2,600 production contracts with
over i,ooo prime contractors, involving more than i5,0o subcontractors.
Previously, the District had negotiated the settlement of more than 2,300
terminated production contracts. In view of the size of its operations and
the diversification in its procurements, there is reason to assume that the
experiences of this contracting agency provide a representative crosssection of the workings of the national program for settlement of terminated war contracts.
On July 22, 1944, the Chicago Ordnance District closed the first major
termination of the war program, settling a $217,000,000 terminated tank
contract with the International Harvester Company. Under this contract there were 438 first tier subcontractors and over 3,ooo other subcontractors, some removed by seven or eight tiers from the prime contractor. Although it required sixteen months from the date of termination to
arrive at a settlement agreement, the intricacy of the contractual arrangements and the novelty of the problems had led many persons to believe
that the maze would not be unraveled for two or three years. The case
provided a testing ground for many termination procedures and resulted
in the establishment of several major settlement policies. When Government officials announced to the newspapers that the case had been closed,
they predicted that future settlement negotiations could be completed in
ninety days, and this forecast in large measure has been fulfilled. Beyond
all doubt, the experiment with the International Harvester Company
was a success in demonstrating the effectiveness and potentialities of
winding up terminated contracts through businesslike negotiations.
On the other hand, the Harvester tank termination is a noteworthy
example of the loose ends with which this article is concerned. The settlement agreement of July 22, 1944, did provide the corporation with the full
amount agreed upon as fair and reasonable compensation for its efforts
under the contract, and in that sense the termination was then closed.
However, certain substantial rights and obligations under the terminated
contract were expressly reserved in the settlement, and even at this writing-fifteen months later-some of these have not been finally concluded.
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A review of the files reveals that several vexatious claims of subcontractors
were excepted from the original agreement, and although these subsequently were assumed by the Government for direct settlement, a few are
still not closed. Also, the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect
to the $io,48o,ooo of Government-owned facilities acquired under the
contract were specifically left open in the settlement. The bulk of this
equipment subsequently was transferred to a separate master facilities
lease and a later production contract, but some even now remains subject
to the terminated tank contract. To date, these facilities occupy much the
same status as before the settlement agreement was signed.
At first impression these various loose ends may arouse concern, posing
the question whether the settlement job is being slighted. Possibly a few
cases will be found with shortcomings, but the vast majority of termination proceedings, including the Harvester case, have been conducted with
thoroughness and efficiency. Certainly it is far better to have terminations
settled with the speed and effectiveness of a well-knit business operation,
rather than permit cumbersome and dilatory tactics to threaten our economic reconversion. Streamlined automobiles are not abandoned because
they sometimes run over pedestrians; and speedy airplanes are not
grounded because they occasionally collide with skyscrapers. Neither
should termination settlements be wrapped in red tape because speed is
accompanied by some deficiencies. But at the same time it would be
ostrich-like to shut our eyes to such imperfections merely because the
over-all policy is sound. It is believed that the following exploration of
the causes and consequences of typical loose ends in settlements should
help reduce to a minimum the shortcomings and aid in securing prompt
disposition of open matters. This analysis, however, which focuses attention upon the relatively infrequent or more minor aspects of a huge enterprise, must not distort the broad perspective. By any standard, the national termination settlement program has been well conceived and successfully administered.2
STANDARD IRESERVATIONS IN SETTLEMENTS

Termination settlements are normally consummated by the execution
of a supplemental agreement to the terminated contract which provides
that, upon the payment of an agreed amount to the contractor, "all
rights and liabilities of the parties under the contract and under the [Con2See Fourth Report (War Contract Terminations and Settlements) by the Director of

Contract Settlement to the Congress, July 1945.
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tract Settlement] Act, in so far as it pertains to the contract,-shall cease
forthwith and be forever released," except for those items which are specifically reserved. A consideration of loose ends in termination settlements
necessarily is concerned largely with the exceptions that follow this general release.
By far the largest number of such exceptions are the standard ones
suggested by regulations for use in connection with the prescribed *forms
for settlement agreements. These standard reservations may be divided
into two general classes. The first class consists of purely formal reservations of rights and obligations the parties have by virtue of statutes or
executive orders, including, for example: (i) all rights of the Government
to take the benefit of any adjustment under the Royalty Adjustment Act;
and (2) all rights and liabilities of the parties under the Contract Settlement Act relating to removal and storage of termination inventory. In
reality, these formal reservations may be superfluous inasmuch as the
general release does not purport to cover these non-contractual rights and
liabilities and, moreover, it is doubtful whether the parties are capable
of contracting away the operation of statutes and executive orders. However, certain laws and orders commence operating as a result of a contractual relationship between the parties. The formal reservations serve to
prevent contractors from erroneously assuming that termination of the
contractual relationship also terminates operation of allied statutes and
executive orders.
The second class of standard reservations pertains to various contractual rights and obligations which, because of their very nature, were intended by the parties to remain executory long after other phases of the
'contract are completed. Termination of a contract, in itself, does not alter
the nature of rights and obligations such as those: (i) arising under the
contract articles which relate to reproduction rights, patent infringements,
inventions, and application for patents; (2) concerning the Government's
contractual right to take the benefit of agreements reducing or otherwise
affecting royalties paid or payable in connection with performance of the
contract; (3)applicable to options, covenants not to compete, and covenants of indemnity; or (4)concerning defects in, and guarantees or warranties relating to, any completed articles or component parts furnished
to the Government by the contractor pursuant to the contract. These
rights and obligations are peculiar in that the facts upon which they
operate might not come into existence or be uncovered until the lapse
of considerable time. Nothing that can be done by the parties in settling
a terminated contract will alter this condition, and so it has become stand-
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5

ard practice to except such rights and obligations from settlement agreements. 3
None of these standard reservations, however, should be considered a
loose end of termination settlements. All of them are the usual strands
dangling after Government contracts, and are in no sense an indication
that a termination settlement is incomplete. 4 For this reason they need
not be discussed at length.
TREATMENT OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED FACILITIES IN SETTLEMENTS

Of all the matters left open in any substantial number of executed termination settlement agreements, perhaps the most mysterious, and certainly the most misunderstood, are rights and obligations concerning
Government-owned facilities used by contractors in performing their production contracts. A general impression of the dollar-wise importance of
these facilities may be gained from statistics compiled from records of the
Chicago Ordnance District. On V-E Day, contractors of the District held
approximately 3o,ooo pieces of Government-owned basic equipment,
having an estimated cost of $i8o,ooo,ooo. Most of the machines were
equipped with accessories and attachments, including hand tools for
operation and maintenance of the basic units. Random samplings of the
property accounts indicate that there were at least four such minor items
for each major piece of equipment. A large number of contractors in addition possessed Government facilities in the form of materials and fixtures
incorporated into their plants to enable installation of equipment.5 Under
3 Arrangements may be made for eliminating some of the standard reservations. For example, a settlement agreement may provide for the release of a contractor's warranty obligations. See Joint Termination Regulation (8-xo-45) para. 742.3, 742.4, 981.1 and 983.1. Contracting agencies have been instructed that before releasing such warranty liability they should
determine that the Government is receiving what is deemed to be adequate consideration for
the release. See Ordnance Procurement Instructions (io-i-45) para. 15,763.

4At least one contractor has strongly objected to the use of standard reservations in settlement agreements. In returning a boilerplate settlement agreement "as being not in proper
form," the contractor complained:
"This [agreement] covers from our standpoint complete cancellation at no cost to the Government for complete units none of which and no part of which have been delivered. Therefore
the termination must be without any exceptions and those which you have interposed are
irrelevant, immaterial and do not constitute cancellation.
"We desire to dispose of the matter and close our file
and not be subject to further expenses
by unnecessary further checking, snooping, demands for silly reports etc. etc. etc. etc. We are
trying to save the Government money but have no desire to be compelled to spend of our own
to satisfy we don't know what [sic]."
sIn an opinion rendered on June 16, 1945, the Director of Materiel, Headquarters, Army
Service Forces (War Department) ruled that the Government does not have title to a large
portion of the installation materials for which the Government had directly or indirectly reimbursed its contractors. This decision, embodied in a first indorsement to the Chief of Ordnance,

TEE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

some contracts the installed Government facilities even comprised plant
improvements and additions designed to habilitate the contractors'
premises for war production. While the more common facilities provisions
in contracts were changed several times during the war, in general all
obligated contractors to return the various classes of facilities and, with
certain minor exceptions, to maintain them in good repair and operating
condition.6 These obligations, and the corresponding rights of the Govprovided in part as follows: "It is the opinion of this office that the proper interpretation of
[Procurement Regulations] is that title to installation materials not identifiably listed on [contracts] is not intended to be and is not vested in the Government by virtue of the facilities article, notwithstanding the fact that the Government may have borne the cost of such materials, directly through reimbursement of the cost or lump sum payment of installation cost or
indirectly through the contract price ..... It is important to note, however, that although
as indicated above, title to the installation materials is not in the Government merely because
the Government bore the cost of the installation of the facilities, the fact that facilities are installed is very material in determining their value for purposes of sale to the contractor in possession." See Ordnance Procurement Circular r37-45, June i6, 1945.
6Most facilities articles in Chicago Ordnance District contracts contain one of two pairs of
liability clauses. The first pair listed below was used earlier in the procurement program:

(r) "The contractor agrees at its own expense to keep the facilities in good operating condition and repair and to make repairs and replacements to the extent that the necessity for
such repairs is due to wear and tear resulting from operational activity.
"The contractor shall not be liable for loss or destruction of or damage to the facilities
unless such loss, damage, or destruction results from failure to perform the duty imposed
by the preceding clause or from wilful misconduct or failure to exercise good faith on the
part of the contractor's corporate officers or other representatives having supervision or
direction of the operations of the whole of the contractor's business or of the whole of any
plant operated by the contractor in performance of this contract.
(2) "The contractor shall not be liable for loss or destruction of or damage to facilities title to
which has vested in the Government (a) caused by any peril while the facilities are in
transit off the contractor's premises, or (b) caused by any of the following perils while the
facilities are on the contractor's or subcontractor's or other premises or by removal therefrom because of any of the following perils:
Fire; lightning; windstorm, cyclone, tornado, hail; explosion; riot, riot attending a strike,
civil commotion; vandalism and malicious mischief; aircraft or objects falling therefrom;
vehicles running on land or tracts, excluding vehicles owned or operated by the contractor or any agent or employee of the contractor; smoke; sprinkler leakage, earthquake or volcanic eruption; flood, meaning thereby rising of rivers or streams; enemy attack or any action taken by the military, naval or air forces of the United States in resisting enemy attack.
"Except to the extent of any loss or destruction of or damage to facilities for which the
contractor is relieved of liability under the foregoing provisions of this paragraph, and except for reasonable wear and tear or depreciation, the facilities (other than facilities permitted to be sold) shall be returned by the contractor to the Government, or delivered by
the contractor to any designee of the Government (at the time elsewhere in this article
provided) in as good condition as when received by the contractor in connection with this
contract. In aid of its obligation so to return the facilities, the contractor shall, at its own
expense, maintain a program for the proper use, care and maintenance of the facilities, as
well as a property control and accounting system consistent with good business practice,
and make repairs and replacements."

SPEEDY TERMINATION SETTLEMENTS

ernment, form the core of "facilities questions" in termination settle7
ments.
To appreciate the scope and nature of facilities questions which may
arise in connection with settling a terminated production contract, the
relationship between termination settlements and loss or damage of
Government-owned facilities needs to be explored. This relationship in
essence rests upon the contractual alliance, if any, between the terminated
contract which is being settled and the facilities which have been lost or
damaged. Where facilities are held by the contractor under the provisions
of a production contract which is terminated, either rights and obligations pertaining to such facilities must be concluded in the termination
settlement, or the contract has to be kept open in order later to resolve
facilities questions. In this sense, final disposition of rights and obligations
as to facilities controlled by a terminated contract constitutes a necessary
part of a full settlement of that contract. Even though resolution of facilities questions does not go to the heart of a termination settlement-which
consists of compensating the contractor for cancellation of his contractthe terminated contract cannot be finally closed until rights and obligations concerning such facilities have been settled. In effect, a termination
settlement which excludes relevant facilities questions is comparable to
a contract which has run to completion but on which the parties have not
as yet adjusted rights and liabilities in respect of facilities leased under the
contract. In both situations the .contractor has performed his obligations
as to production and delivery of supplies, the Government has reimbursed
the contractor for his work, but the facilities portion of the contract remains executory.
The facilities used by contractors in performing production contracts
frequently are not held under the provisions of those contracts. Where
such production contracts are terminated they may be settled in full and
closed without resolving questions as to the facilities. These fundamentally different relationships may be made clear through a summary of three
common arrangements under which facilities are held by contractors:
i. Facilities were acquired and are used by the contractor under the terms of a
production contract. Rights and obligations as to these facilities are controlled by the
production contract-and the contract may not be completely dosed, even after termi7Another group of facilities questions which have arisen in connection with terminations
concern reimbursement by the Government to the contractor for the cost of acquiring or manufacturing facilities for Government account. These questions normally are resolved by an audit
and seldom are controversial. Few difficulties arise in lumping reimbursement for facilities into
the negotiated termination settlement, and the Chicago Ordnance District generally has followed that practice since it was authorized by regulations. In this article reimbursement problems will not be treated as "facilities questions."
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nation, until such rights and obligations have been settled. At V-E Day about 9,00o
of the major facilities in the Chicago Ordnance District were held by contractors on
this basis.
2. Facilities were acquired by the contractor under an earlier production contract,
which was either completed or terminated, and thereafter the contractor is authorized
by a later production contract to continue using the facilities. In this situation, loss or
damage of facilities while they are used under the later contract may be controlled by
it, and, if so, full settlement of that contract upon termination must include resolution
of these matters. Adjustment for loss or damage occurring under the earlier contract,
as will be explained subsequently, likewise may be a necessary element of settling the
later contract in full. It is estimated that on V-E Day some 7,000 major pieces of Chicago Ordnance District equipment were employed on production contracts authorizing
use of facilities which had been acquired by contractors under earlier production contracts.
3. Facilities are held by the contractor under a lease which is independent of all
production contracts. Here, facilities questions are to be resolved under the provisions
of the lease. Where the lease is terminated and all the leased facilities were used on
production contracts with a single contracting agency (which also represents the Government on the lease), it might be advisable for convenience to combine negotiations
for the settlement of the terminated lease and any terminated production contracts on
which the facilities were employed. Even where this is done, however, questions as to
facilities under the lease are not affected by terms of the terminated production contracts, and sucl contracts may be settled in full without consideration of questions
respecting facilities on the lease. About 14,ooo major facilities of the Chicago Ordnance
District were held by contractors under separate leases on V-E Day.

Inasmuch as disposition of facilities questions necessarily entails an
inventory and inspection of the facilities, it is easy to understand why
prior to cessation of a major portion of hostilities many contracting
agencies frequently excepted facilities questions from termination settlements. After termination of a production contract under which facilities
were held, the contractor in most instances would be kept in the procurement program and authorized to use the facilities on another production

contract or under a facilities lease. To have settled all existing facilities
questions would have meant undertaking an otherwise unnecessary inventory and inspection of the facilities at a time when manpower was
vitally needed for production of supplies. Contractors as well as contracting agencies desired to avoid disrupting production and diverting skilled
labor, with the result that facilities questions by mutual consent were

excepted from termination settlement agreements. This lack of finality
as to facilities seemed logical where the Government permitted the contractor to continue using the facilities. At best, the parties could have
settled only for loss or damage which had occurred prior to the time the
facilities were transferred from the jurisdiction of one document to another.
Another phase of this use of facilities on successive and several con-

SPEEDY TERMINATION SETTLEMENTS

tracts was the program of contracting agencies to transfer control of
facilities from production contracts to master facilities leases. When facilities acquired under certain production contracts became necessary for
the performance of other contracts with the same contractor, the Government found that administration of its facilities could be improved through
bringing together under a single master lease most or all facilities in the
possession of the contractor. Among other reasons, this consolidation was
designed to reduce the number of governing instruments, standardize
and equalize the terms under which facilities were held, and simplify
spreading the use of facilities over a number of production contracts. The
contracting agencies conducted an extensive campaign to sell contractors
on the scheme, with the result in the Chicago Ordnance District that on
V-E Day about 45 per cent of all major facilities were under master facilities leases. For reasons already noted, no inventory or inspection of
facilities was accomplished at the time of their transfer from production
contracts to facilities leases, and so the parties were not in a position to
settle the facilities questions which might have arisen under the production contracts. In effect, the change-over of facilities to master leases
merely postponed en masse the resolution of facilities questions-a consequence of continuing use of the facilities.
Even so, as matters have worked out in practice apparently there are
no facilities questions to be resolved under the production contracts from
which facilities were transferred, without inventory or inspection, to subsequent production contracts and master leases. In theory, under the
terms of some older production contracts, it could be argued that loss and
damage of facilities occurring prior to such transfer would be subject
only to the provisions of the production contracts under which the facilities were then being employed.8 Actually there seldom is available data
upon which to determine the precise or even approximate date of loss or
damage; consequently apportioning discrepancies among consecutive contracts becomes almost impossible. Because the measure of the contractor's obligations and liabilities usually remains unchanged as facilities
pass from the control of one contract to another, the contractor is unlikely
to object to treating all discrepancies as having occurred under the last
controlling contract. Furthermore, under the facilities clauses in more
recent production contracts, the contractor's liability for loss or damage
of facilities probably does not mature until the time he is required to re8In this connection refer to the first pair of liability clauses set out in note 6 supra. Under
these clauses it might be urged that the contractor's liability matured as of the time he failed
to follow a sound maintenance program and that such liability would be enforceable only under
the contract on which the facilities were held at the time of this failure.
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turn the facilities, so that authorization in a subsequent contract for continued use of the facilities would preclude liability for loss or damage from
accruing under the previous instrument.9 Although the contractual transfer of facilities without an inventory and inspection postpones settling
facilities questions, this practice only nominally keeps open these questions under the earlier contracts. For this reason, the omission to resolve
facilities questions in termination settlements with contractors remaining
in the production program was, in most instances, a matter of little significance.
While prior to V-E Day there were relatively few contractors holding
Government-owned facilities who dropped out of the war procurement
program upon termination of particular production contracts, the situation thereafter was reversed., After V-J Day almost all Governmentowned facilities became idle."° It might be expected that the settlements
of later-date terminations would wind up all facilities questions arising
under terminated production contracts." But the fact is that complete
finality with respect to facilities has not always been achieved in termination settlements.
Contractors going out of the war program often have desired to reserve
disposition of facilities questions in order to speed the'execution of termination settlement agreements. Realizing that settlement of facilities questions arising under terminated contracts must rest upon inventories and
inspections by Government representatives, and being informed that normally these are not undertaken until actual removal of facilities, contractors have preferred closing termination settlements by excepting all
facilities questions. In other words, loose ends may result from a desire for
speedy settlements and from a general appreciation of the fact that clearance of facilities from plants might not keep abreast of termination negotiations. Moreover, in many cases contractors probably feel that, since they
9 See the second pair of liability clauses contained in note 6 above. The most likely construction of these provisions is that the contractor's obligations for care and maintenance are
tied in with his obligation to return the facilities at the proper time.
10 At the end of the war with Japan, about 230 contractors of the Chicago Ordnance District held Government facilities subject to the terms oi production contracts.
1%
The authority to include resolution of facilities questions in a termination settlement is
clearly set out in Joint Termination Regulation (8-io-45) para. 868(i): "If a facilities contract
is included in a supply, construction or other contract which has been terminated in whole or
in part, or if a separate facilities contract has been terminated in whole or in part, the liability
of the war contractor for loss of and damage to plant equipment furnished to or acquired by
the war contractor under the facilities contract may be settled by negotiation in and as a part
of any negotiated settlement of such terminated contract. Where not settled by agreement, it
may be settled in accordance with the provisions of the contract, using the procedures for a
formula settlement under a fixed-price supply contract insofar zs applicable."
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acted in good faith in caring for Government-owned property, the reservation of facilities questions is merely a formality. Some of these very contractors are considerably surprised to learn later that, despite their good
intentions, the Government treats them as liable for the value of missing
facilities. Apparently these contractors forgot, or never knew, that the
resolution of facilities questions not foreclosed in a negotiated termination settlement is subject to the scrutiny of a strict accounting and prop-

erty audit.12
Two groups of Government personnel also have had reasons for excepting facilities questions from termination settlements. The first consists
of termination negotiators who have been motivated by the same desire
for speed as contractors in order to meet schedules set up for settlements.
These work standards, and the reports predicated upon them, are a necessary and highly effective means of gauging and controlling the progress of
many thousands of individuals constituting the Government termination
team. In order to have a common denominator and realistic basis for
charting this progress, the control system has used as its basic unit of
measure the full payment of prime contractors' termination charges.
Reservations in settlements which do not preclude such full payment are
not in confict with the main goal of the national program and are divorced
from the basic measurement of accomplishments. Reflecting the need for
performing "first things first," negotiators have had to concentrate on
concluding settlements which would result in compensating prime contractors in full. Where facilities questions, being of secondary importance,
interfered with the main goal, negotiators have been willing to reserve
them for future disposition.
The second group which, until recently, shared the negotiators' attitude consisted of the individuals designated as responsible for maintaining
Government-property accounts. The position long taken by the property
officers can be explained best by an example. Suppose that through an inventory and inspection the contractor properly accounted for the condition and existence of all facilities listed on the property records, and that
the termination settlement agreement contained a mutual release of all
rights and obligations as to facilities held under the terminated contract.
If the property officer used that release as a blanket credit to his account,
what would happen if later it were discovered that a certain facility
12A general impression of the number of cases involving lost or damaged facilities maybe
gained from figures compiled from Chicago Ordnance District records. During July 1945, cases
were closed with fifteen contractors. In eleven of these cases the contractors were'held liable.
During the following month, August, 1945, twenty-four cases were completed. Contractors
were held liable in three of them.
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through error initially had been omitted from the account and in fact
never had been returned by the contractor?' 3 Remembering the possibility of their being liable for property not accounted for, property officers
continued to request reservation of facilities questions from termination
settlement agreements until assured that a mutual release of rights and
obligations as to all facilities would adequately protect them where accounts were in error. Not until after V-J Day were property officers en4
tirely satisfied as to their position under such a mutual release.
Though contractors and Government personnel avoided consideration
of facilities questions in termination settlements, at times both groups
recognized that mere reservation of facilities questions was unsatisfactory for reasons other than lack of completeness and finality. The facilities
provisions in production contracts generally were drafted with primary
attention being given to acquisition and use of facilities, while arrangements for their maintenance and storage by the contractor after ceasing
production were not spelled out in practical detail. If extensive storage or
standby were likely, rather than only reserve facilities questions in a termination settlement, the parties sometimes preferred to enter into a separate maintenance or storage, agreement covering the facilities. Obviously,
this procedure could not conclusively settle all rights and obligations as
to facilities. Moreover, since an inventory and inspection of facilities
usually was not desired at the time of their transfer to a storage agreement, the parties almost always reserved facilities questions under the
terminated production contract so as to leave open a means of later
'3 A similar set of circumstances actually developed in one case in which the Chicago Ordnance District closed all facilities questions in a negotiated termination settlement. The missing
machine had been moved into the plant of a subcontractor and at the time of settlement was
listed on the wrong property account. Even though, as noted later in the text, the property
officer now is protected in this situation, it seems questionable whether the Government gave
up title to the machine by way of the release in the settlement agreement. The usual release
states that all rights and liabilities under the terminated contract cease, except as otherwise
specifically provided. It could be argued that such a release ends the contractor's obligation to
return the once missing machine. On the other hand, it might be urged that the release does
not contain words of conveyance and therefore cannot operate to pass title. That is, rights
and liabilities under the contract may have ended, but the Government's title in the machine
is not founded on the terminated contract; even after execution of the release, the Government
would have its common law remedies to recover the machine.
'4 At this writing it seems likely that in the immediate future an important reason for not
concluding facilities questions in termination settlements will be that settlements will outstrip
the speed with which plants are cleared of facilities. This prediction is based on the time goals
established by the Chicago Ordnance District. It appears that the goals for dosing termination
settlements require that a large number of settlements be completed prior to clearance of the
plants involved. This means, of course, that all facilities questions cannot be disposed of in such
termination settlements unless the facilities remaining in the plants after settlement are placed
under interim storage agreements.
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settling for loss of and damage to facilities occurring prior to execution of
the storage agreement. Chicago Ordnance District records indicate that
in only one case of transferring facilities from a production contract to a
storage agreement were rights and obligations as to facilities under the
production contract released-and that arrangement was completed before the production contract was terminated.
To this point, the discussion of Government-owned facilities has been
directed mainly at explaining why, in practice, facilities questions often
have been reserved in termination settlements. The fact that such reservations have been common, however, apart from historical aspects, is of real
significance only in view of the consequences attendant upon making
these reservations. In analyzing the consequences, sight must not be lost
of the consideration that virtually all termination settlements have been
negotiated settlements. In short, the parties arrange for settlement
through a businesslike process of give and take, which produces an overall "deal" acceptable as fair and equitable to both parties.
Reserving facilities questions from a termination settlement automatically results in excluding these questions from the give and take leading
to the settlement agreement. This effect alone might be unimportant, but
it almost invariably is accompanied by the situation that all liabilities in
respect of facilities run exclusively from the contractor to the Government. That is, facilities questions practically always concern shortages
and damages in facilities, and liability for such discrepancies in Government-owned property can only be against the contractor and in favor of
the Government. 5 On the other hand, a termination settlement chiefly is
concerned with discharging the Government's liability to the contractor
arising from cancellation of the contract. The exclusion of facilities questions from a termination settlement therefore means eliminating from
the businesslike exchanges of settlement negotiations a potential liability of the contractor, and postponing consideration of it to a time when
the contractor is making no claim against the Government.' 6
Negotiation of facilities questions at such a later date sometimes becomes extremely difficult to conduct, for the area of give and take is
Is See note 7, supra. In a few cases the reservation of all facilities questions from a termination settlement might leave certain sums owed by the Government to the contractor as reimbursement for acquisition or manufacture of facilities. However, such reimbursement generally
is calculated on an audit basis, so that the area for negotiation is very limited.
16 If the contracting agency is slow in removing facilities from a contractor's plant, the contractor may be in a position to assert a claim for the expense entailed in retaining the facilities.
Most facilities articles and master facilities leases provide in effect that the contractor shall retain facilities in a stand-by condition at his own expense for 90 days after they become idle and
available; thereafter, the burden may be shifted to the Government.
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limited to a narrow path running in but one direction. Reduced to basic
elements, the situation ordinarily consists of a claim by the Government
for the value of missing or damaged facilities and possible resistance to
the claim on the part of the contractor. The Government representatives
are under an obligation to attempt to collect payment for the value,
while the contractor may well feel that his breach should be overlooked
in view of his good war production record. Since the termination settlement is long past, the contractor might adopt the attitude that liability
for discrepancies in facilities should be forgotten..Thus, the task of enforcing a contractor's liability is apt to be unpleasant, and with war procurement over (and no further contracts forthcoming), the resistance of contractors can be expected to increase. 7 Both contractors and the Government wish to avoid future time-consuming and irritating negotiations
of this nature. Were facilities questions treated as but one factor among
many in the termination settlement, in all probability a fair and equitable
disposition of a contractor's liability could be reached without much
bickering. This is especially true inasmuch as a contractor's liability in
respect of facilities normally is small in comparison to the total amount
of the termination settlement.
The negotiator's report on the facilities aspect of a termination administered by the Chicago Ordnance District persuasively illustrates the
advisability of a complete settlement-particularly in regard to protecting the interests of the Government. in explaining the treatment of lost
and damaged facilities in the over-all deal, which involved a gross settlement of $876,886.io and a net settlement of $116,022.77 for the termination of a contract to produce carbines, the negotiator stated:
Because of the protracted negotiations with the contractor and the difficulties in
connection with its administration and settlement, it was decided to settle at the time
of the termination all questions in connection with Government-owned as well as contractor-owned property. The agreement was made that to the extent Governmentowned equipment of any kind could not be accounted for the amount of the settlement
would be reduced, the amount of the reduction to be determined by an appraisal of the
fair current value of the equipment missing. At the time of final settlement the property records of the District had been reduced to a zero balance with the exception of
x7During the war procurement program, there were relatively few cases in the Chicago
Ordnance District in which the parties could not readily agree upon the contractor's liability
for lost or damaged facilities. In most instances contractors recognized the advisability of accepting findings of the agency in order to avoid disputes. There is evidence at this writing,
however, that with war procurement activity ended, some contractors are fighting hard to
keep every dollar. In this connection note the prediction of two former members of the Chicago Ordnance District that, as to a contractor's obligations respecting Government facilities,
"enforcement will be a difficult problem." Fain and Watt, War Procurement-A New Pattern
in Contracts, 44 Col. L. Rev. 127, 139 (1944).
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property having a fair current value of $32,706. The settlement was reduced in this
amount in consideration of the elimination of further liability on the part of the contractor for such missing property. In making this reduction it was considered that the
amount thereof would adequately cover the contingency of losses arising or being made
known to the government subsequent to the date the settlement agreement was signed.
Further reduction was made in the sum of $1,367.48 reflecting recovery by the government of loss through damage to Government-owned facilities. In view of this arrangement, the termination supplement does not except from the settlement the provisions of the Government-owned facilities article as all rights and liabilities of the
parties under the provisions of this article are settled by the termination agreement.

. The disadvantageous position of the Government resulting from not
considering facilities in termination settlement negotiations also has a direct bearing upon the ultimate treatment and disposition of Governmentowned facilities in the form of installation materials and plant improvements and additions. Usually these built-in facilities have little sale value
after removal from the contractor's plant, and frequently the cost of removal exceeds the anticipated proceeds from a later sale. Where removal
is uneconomical, and the facilities are of no substantial value to the contractor in possession and will not interfere with his commercial production, arrangements generally can be made to abandon the facilities in
place.' 8 However, where not-readily-severable facilities are of substantial

value to the contractor in possession, abandonment would confer a windfall on him. Regulations prohibit this course,' 9 but they also appear to
preclude in many cases removing the facilities at a net loss to the Government.20 The dilemma seemingly can be solved only by arranging a sale of
these facilities to the contractor in possession.
15 Joint Termination Regulation (8-io-45) para. 864.4 provides: "(i) The contracting
officer may discard or abandon items of plant equipment when he determines that they are
worthless ..... (2) Plant equipment which is not readily severable from the war contractor's
plant and which has no substantial value to the war contractor may be considered worthless if
the estimated cost of dismantling, removal and sale of such plant equipment (including the
cost of repairing any damage done to the war contractor's plant to the extent that the Government may be liable therefor) exceeds the estimated net return to the Government upon sale
of such plant equipment when dismantled and removed."
,9Surplus Property Board Regulation No. 6 para. 5(d) provides: "Sales of all plant equipment, not readily severable, shall be made at the fair value thereof. Fair value shall be determined by the owning agency (employing appraisers to the extent deemed necessary or desirable), and, in order to prevent windfalls, primary consideration shall be given to the value of
the plant equipment to the owner of the premises for the purpose for which it is to be used."
20 Joint Termination Regulation (8-1o-45) para. 86 1.x (4) provides: "The War Department
will permit the severance of plant equipment, which is not readily severable, only if the contracting officer shall have given prior written authorization therefor. Such authorization shall
be given if such plant equipment is required for redistribution for war production or in the interests of national defense. Such authorization may be given if (a) the estimated net proceeds
to the Government from the plant equipment when severed will substantially exceed the estimated cost to the Government of the severance and removal, including the cost of repairing
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In arriving at the sale price of not-readily-severable facilities, the Surplus Property Board has directed that primary consideration be given to
the value of the facilities to the purchasing contractor.2' This eminently
fair principle is frequently difficult of application because a hard-bargaining contractor is well aware that the alternatives to sale on his terms are
abandonment or removal at a loss. Often the Government's best possibility of securing a reasonable return on its facilities is sale to the possessor
while he has (or might have) claims against the Government which will be
settled by negotiation. This means arranging a sale either while the contract governing the facilities is still being performed or during negotiations
following its termination. After completion of the contract or settlement
for its termination, the Government will be without compensating leverage in negotiating the sale of built-in facilities.
The Government's bargaining position in selling not-readily-severable
facilities is of greater than usual significance. Government-owned plant
improvements and additions, especially under cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts, frequently are relatively expensive, and their value to the contractor in possession is open to widely varying opinions. In some cases the
private plant habilitated at Government expense had been idle for years
prior to the war procurement program, and the contractor might insist
that it will again be closed down. Under these circumstances, the contractor may refuse to recognize that the improvements and additions
enhance the value of his plant. From the Government's viewpoint, however, the contractor has received a potential benefit at least to the extent
that the sale value of the habilitated plant has increased. In reply the
contractor may say that he does not intend to sell, and furthermore, the
market for such plants is unpredictable-particularly since the Government is currently disposing of surplus plants which are only a few years
old. In these and similar situations it must be admitted that the value of
facilities to the contractor cannot be measured in advance by any commonly accepted standards. The parties conceivably could postpone fixing
"a sale price for a certain period in order to secure more enlightening facts
as to value, but neither contracting agencies nor contractors have been
inclined to indorse creation of such contingent liabilities. Likewise, conany damage to the war contractor's plant to the extent that the Government may be liable
therefor .... or (b) the war contractor in possession has requested such authorization and the
plant equipment is of such a nature or is so attached to or embodied in the war contractor's
plant, that the Government's failure to remove it will materially interfere with his other war
production or reconversion to civilian production."
2 See note ig, supra.
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tractors consistently have refused to purchase at a price subsequently to
be established by a third party arbiter. Immediate negotiation of price
apparently is the only mutually satisfactory method of consummating
sale, and with value being largely a matter of opinion, bargaining position
often is the critical element in arriving at the sale price.
In selling not-readily-severable facilities to contractors in possession,
there is an exceptionally strong reason for contracting agencies to insure
receipt of a fair price. Where a contractor obtains an overly liberal settlement of his termination claim, the Government can expect to recoup a
substantial portion of the contractor's "excess" profit through renegotiation and taxes. These safeguards are not present where the contractor's
windfall is in the form of facilities acquired at prices far below cost. Such
an acquisition does not involve "income" or "profit," and the facilities
need be capitalized merely at the contractor's purchase price. This consideration may lead contractors to drive hard bargains in obtaining builtin facilities from the Government. But even though enhancement in plant
value over and above the price paid for Government habilitation is technically not a renegotiable or taxable profit, it may represent a real gain
to the contractor. Contracting agencies have a compelling obligation to
guard against conferring such hidden gains which escape public scrutiny.
In this connection contracting agencies have had to recognize that an
acquisition appearing on the surface to bestow a windfall on the contractor
might actually turn out to be of small value to him. Many plant improvements for war purposes are in excess of contractors' normal requirements.
If a contractor should attempt to cash in through sale of excess plant
capacity acquired from the Government at low prices, he would have an
equally low base for the computation of any capital gain realized on the
transaction. If he retains the assets, which in many cases are not designed
for, or particularly adapted to, peacetime production, expensive alterations may be required before the improved plant can be efficiently put to
postwar use. In addition, future depreciation would be allowable only
upon the basis of the low acquisition cost.
It should also be observed that contractors who undertook plant improvements and habilitation at their oun expense under certificates of
necessity might have received even larger gains than contractors who obtain Government facilities at what appear to be bargain prices. The shortening of the amortization period from sixty months to the span of time
between "acquisition date" and September 3o, 1945,2 has had the effect
of permitting certificate holders to acquire improvements and habilitation
22

Presidential Proclamation 2669, io Fed. Reg. 12475, Oct. 4, 1945.
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(or even new plants) fully paid for through wartime production. Granted,
certificate holders had to advance the funds for making capital improvements, while the Government advanced the money for improvements to
which it reserved title. But considering that the certificate holder added
the cost of built-in facilities to his other production costs, and therefore
received a profit on the advance, it appears that the certificate holder
usually obtained a better deal than the contractor in possession who purchased Government-owned facilities at a nominal price. This comparison
is all the more pointed since the monetary risk factor proved to be almost
hegligible in both cases. Even so, the good fortunes of certificate holders
cannot excuse contracting agencies from their duty to secure fair values
on sales of built-in facilities.
Having shown the need for placing the Government in a strong bargaining position in selling not-readily-severable facilities to contractors in
possession, a few case histories will illustrate the types of deals which can
be arranged by combining the conveyance of built-in facilities with a
negotiated termination settlement of the contract under which the facilities were acquired.
Case One involved the settlement of a terminated $465,65oooo costplus-a-fixed-fee contract to produce tanks and spare parts. The contractor's plant, which previously had not been used for many years and was
in a decaying condition, was rehabilitated with Government funds at
an expense of approximately $5oo,ooo. Of this amount, $169,2oo represented the installed cost of plant improvements and additions which
Government experts considered as "having value to the contractor or
Government." The story of how these facilities were handled in the negotiated termination settlement is clearly narrated in the following excerpts
from the negotiator's report:
Summarized, the Production Service Branch found that it would cost the Government $25,000 to dismantle and remove the rehabilitation, while the total potential
salvage value of such property was only $5,ooo0, On the other hand, the value of the
Contractor's plant would be enhanced approximately $32,ooo if the rehabilitation were
left in place and intact.
The attention of the Contracting Officer was directed to the provision of Regulation
No. 6 of the Surplus Property Board requiring that "sales of all plant equipment, not
readily severable, shall be made at the fair value thereof. Fair value shall be determined by the owning agency .... , and in order to prevent windfalls, primary consideration shall be given to the value of the plant equipment to the owner of the
premises for the purpose for which it is to be used." After being informed that the rehabilitation property would enhance the contractor's plant by approximately $32,ooo,
all reasonable efforts were made to obtain a fair and proper purchase offer. from the
Contractor. However, the Contractor insisted that the plant used for the tank program had been idle prior to the war program and probably would not be operated after
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the reconversion period. Moreover, the contractor contended that, even if the plant
were operated, no-one could predict the use to which it would be devoted or the value
of the plant improvements to such use. Accordingly, the contractor declined to make.

an offer to purchase the plant improvements and additions.
On the other hand, the Government could not economically dismantle and remove
the property. Not only would it be out of pocket, but, in addition, the Government
probably would have been confronted with a claim for restoration of the buildings to
their original conditions. This matter likewise was referred to the Equipment Disposal
Board, and the Board opposed removing the rehabilitation property.
In view of all these circumstances, the Contracting Officer and his associates decided
that the Government's interests would best be served by passing title to rehabilitation
property to the Contractor as part of the negotiated settlement. This concession by
the Government was then used as a lever to persuade the Contractor to reduce its
claim for a fixed-fee and to forego any present or future claims for restoration of

the plant to its original conditions.
Case Two likewise- involved a tank contract, but here negotiations for
sale of plant improvements and additions were commenced prior to termination at a time when the contractor displayed some interest in acquiring
these facilities. The sale was consummated after termination of the contract, and both parties considered the deal as a preliminary part of the
termination settlement. Room for give and take in the negotiations was
furnished by provisions in the contract obligating the Government to
bear the cost of relocating the contractors own facilities in the places from
which they had been removed, and to reimburse the contractor for the
expense of deferred plant repairs which could not be undertaken during
performance of the contract. In arranging for the sale thepartiesagreed upon
both the estimated cost of discharging those obligations of the Government and the apparent value of the built-in facilities to the contractor.
These double-headed negotiations resulted in sale of facilities costing
about $6oo,ooo (installed) for $i59,ioo, with the contractor receiving a
credit of $I39Joo for releasing the above-stated obligations of the Government (which he had originally evaluated at $345,000). All concerned
were well satisfied that the Government received a fair and reasonable return for its property.
Case Three involved the negotiated settlement of a terminated $22,600,ooo contract for carbines and carbine barrels. The negotiator's report
again furnishes the most realistic account of the manner in which the sale
price of built-in facilities was established. In noting the following passage
from the report, it is important to consider the background, consisting
mainly of a termination claim by the contractor for more than $8oo,000:
The amount paid to the contractor took into consideration the settlement of the
government's interest in plant improvements. The Government had paid the entire
cost, or a substantial part of the cost, of a bus duct system, a subterranean rifle range,
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lighting fixtures, elevator alterations, dry kiln improvements, blow pipe installations,
furnace pits, heat-treating room, steel floor plates and airline installation. The total
amount the Government had paid in connection with these improvements was
$263,505.59. The estimated cost of the material was $128,77o.oo. The [contractor]
offered to pay to the Government $27,i1i.oo for these installations. An appraisal by
Government representatives placed the value of these installations at the end of the

contract at

$47,200.00.

It was estimated by Ordnance personnel that the cost of re-

moval of these improvements would be $25,ooo.oo and that recovery value after removal would be $12,ooo.oo. Under the circumstances it was agreed with the contractor
that he would pay $37,ooo.oo for title to such installations and the negotiated settlement was adjusted in this amount.3
The contention might be raised that sale of Government property as
part of the negotiated settlement of a terminated contract involves the
danger that less than the stated consideration for the property would
actually be received because the contractor will be rewarded with a more
liberal settlement of his termination claim. This danger is recognized,
but the principal safeguards of the public interest are the same whether a
sale and termination settlement are consolidated or arranged separately.
In the ultimate analysis, the net result in either event depends upon the
integrity of the individual negotiators and the reviewing authorities to
whom their recommendations are presented for final approval. Great
confidence and responsibility having been placed in these men, the only
conclusion is that joining the sale of not-readily-severable facilities with
termination settlement negotiations affords the best and most practical
opportunity of protecting the Government's interests. Speedy termination
settlements might by-pass this opportunity.
23A fourth case supplies an object lesson that even in a negotiated settlement it sometimes
is difficult for the Government to overcome the contractor's favorable position in bargaining
for the purchase of built-in facilities. Consider the following passage from the negotiator's
report: "In connection with the contract certain improvements and additions were made to
the contractor's propertywhere the contractwasperformed. The Governmenthad title to these
improvements and had paid $104,4x3.48 for the cost of the work. Of this amount it was estimated that the cost of material alone was $6o,955.oo. As most of this property was attached
to the real estate, it was estimated that the cost of removalwould be approximately $30,000.00
and that the estimated value after removal would be approximately $io,85o.oo. The Disposal
and Salvage Unit of this office stated that it believed a fair price for this rehabilitation work
was $27,775.oo. However, the contractor contended that this rehabilitation was of small value
to him. The only installations which had any immediate value were certain electrical installations which he could use in connection with a Navy contract. For the contractor's purpose
equipment which would cost approximately $r,Soo.ooo to installwould be sufficient and, therefore, the contractor was willing to pay only $r,8oo.oo for the electrical installations and
$200.00 for all of the other equipment which the Government had erected. Although it was believed this was a small return for the improvements, as it would cost the Government more to
remove the facilities than they would be worth and as the possible use upon removal would be
uncertain, it was believed that the sale should be made. Therefore, simultaneously with the
execution of the termination settlement a sales agreement conveying title to this property to
the contractor was executed. This sale was reviewed and approved by the Disposal Board of
this office."
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The favoring of negotiated termination settlements to guard the Government's interests in built-in facilities might seem anomalous in so faras many contracts run to completion and few were drafted in anticipation
of their being terminated and settled by negotiation. Admitting the anomaly, nevertheless it appears that the circumstances of termination and
settlement by negotiation fortuitously furnish a means of aiding the
Government in an otherwise unfavorable situation. Early in the procurement program contracting agencies recognized that the reservation of
title to not-readily-severable facilities constituted a poor device for insuring fair compensation to the Government for bearing the cost of these
facilities.24 However, the need for production, coupled with the strong
bargaining position of potential contractors, led to making that arrangement rather common. Whether or not this expedient was wise or justifiable, the fact is that at the end of the war the Government had title to
such improvements and additions in contractors' plants as walls, smokestacks, floors, heating systems, plumbing, power and lighting systems,
concrete foundations, and many other objects nicely integrated into the
contractors' premises. Pyramided upon the uneconomical cost of effecting
removal, in some cases the Government was obligated by contract to pay
the expense of repairing any damage to the contractor's plant resulting
from removal.2- Furthermore, at least one contractor whose plant was
24 Consider, for example, the following excerpts from Ordnance Fiscal Circular No. 31,
dated May 8, x942:
"Title in the Government is, as a general rule, the best protection of the Government's interest in facilities. However, in certain instances use of none of the standardized methods of
providing new facilities is practicable, usually because it is not feasible or not desirable for the
Government to take title to the facilities. One reason why it may not be feasible for the Government to take title is inseparability of the new facilities from existing privately-owned facilities (examples are "rehabilitation" of a building, "scrambled" facilities, or adaptation of a machine). In these special instances detailed agreements must be entered into to protect the Government's interest in the facilities."
"As far as practicable, direct payment or direct reimbursement by the Government for the
cost of new facilities should be confined to facilities which themselves form a separate unit ....
or which are readily removable or separable from the contractor's existing plant without unreasonable expense or loss of value."
2s An interesting sidelight on the attempts of contractors and termination negotiators to
improve their respective bargaining positions concerns the measure of damages assessable
against the Government if it fails to remove its built-in facilities where required by contract
to bear the expense of removal. Several contractors have asserted that, even'though the builtin facilities did not diminish the value of the plant or its usefulness, the Government would be
liable in damages for the estimated total cost of accomplishing removal. On the other hand,
the Chicago Ordnance District generally has adopted the attitude that, in view of the principles of minimizing damages, the Government's failure would be compensable in damages
measured by the smallest of the following amounts: (x) The monetary equivalent of the lost
value or usefulness of the plant to the contractor; (2) The cost to the contractor of removing
the Government-owned articles; (3) The cost to the contractor of restoring the value or usefulness of the plant by means other than removal of the Government-owned facilities. One
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extensively improved with Government funds raised the troublesome contention that title to all built-in improvements automatically passed to
him since the articles became an essential part of his realty. 2'6 In view of
these circumstances, it should not be difficult to appreciate the benefitshowever anomalous-conferred by termination and subsequent negotiations in which all trumps are not held in one hand.
RESERVATION OF SUBCONTRACT CLAMS IN SETTLEMENTS

Since the very beginning of the termination program claims of subcontractors, unlike facilities questions, have been treated as within the
kernel of settlements. The difference in attitude toward the two features
rests on an apparent distinction in underlying principles. As previously
noted, facilities problems generally are regarded as unrelated to fair comsation for termination claims, and therefore might seem almost foreign
to a termination settlement. Subcontractors' claims, on the other hand,
corollary of this position is that only nominal damages would be assessable where failure to
remove facilities merely caused annoyance or slight inconvenience to the contractor.
Another question frequently raised concerns the types of damages to contractors' plants
which the Government will bear the expense of repairing where by contract the Government
is required to pay the cost of removing its facilities. Answering this question necessitated an
interpretation of the policy of the War Department that the cost of reconverting a contractor's
plant to commercial production will not be borne by the Government except in the few instances where required by express covenants. The interpretation finally adopted is as follows:
"In connection with the dismantling of plant equipment and its removal from the contractor's
plant, this policy [of not paying reconversion costs] is interpreted to prohibit reimbursement
of the contractor (or the assumption by the Government of the obligation to perform the work)
for any items of expense relating to the restoration, repair, or alteration of the premises in order
to correct a condition which was created by or resulted from the installation of the plant equipment ..... It is recognized, however, that incidental structural damage may in some cases
be caused to the premises by the operations of dismantling the plant equipment or removing it
from the plant. Wherever such damage is directly and intentionally caused in the process of
performing an operation which the Government is obligated by the terms of the particular
contract to perform (or for the performance of which the Government is obligated to reimburse the contractor), the obligation will be interpreted to include the repair of such incidental
damage at Government expense." Joint Termination Regulation (8-io-45) para. 861.2 (4)

and (5).
26 The Illinois courts have frequently asserted, by way of dictum, that annexed articles may
not be continued as personal property where: (i) removal of the article necessarily entails
material injury or serious and lasting damage to the realty, or (2) removal could not be accomplished without materially injuring the article itself or seriously impairing its usefulness.
Sword v. Low, 122 Ill. 487, 497, 13 N.E. 826, 829 (1887); Holland Furnace Co. v. Lithuanian,
etc. Ass'n, 286 Ill. App. 453, 464, 13 N.E. 2d 934, 938 (1936); see also Ford v. Cobb, 2o N.Y.
344 (i859), repeatedly cited by Illinois decisions. However, the cases mentioning such a limitation involved the rights of third persons ,whose interest in the real estate would be prejudiced
if the realty were seriously injured through removal of the annexed articles. The rationale of
the limitation disappears where rights of parties outside the agreement to continue annexations
as personalty have not intervened. See dissenting opinion in Bank of Republic v. Wells-Jackson Corp., 358 Ill. 356, 364, 193 N.E. 215, 221 (i934).
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form a part of the prime contractor's charges and often are intricately tied
in with costs incurred by the prime contractor in his own production
operations. Stated in another manner, negotiators and contractors immediately understand that subcontract costs clearly are part of the cost of
the supply items being procured, while they commonly fail to recognize
that loss of or damage to Government-owned property, or sale of such
property at unreasonably low prices, likewise affects the cost of the supply
item. Consequently, unlike the attitude toward facilities questions, concerted efforts usually are made to settle and pay subcontract claims as
part of the settlement of a terminated prime contract.
Despite this approach, the reservation of subcontract claims is the most
common nonroutine exception in termination settlements of the Chicago
Ordnance District. An examination of substantially all of the termination
agreements executed by the District priorto V-J Day and involving settlements in excess of $iooooo revealed that in 12 per cent of the cases certain rights relating to subcontract claims were reserved. These delays in
settling with subcontractors usually stemmed from one or more of the
following facts: (i) the subcontractor asserted a claim for an excessive
amount; (2) the subcontractor was dilatory in presenting his claim; (3) the
higher tier contractor had, or alleged he had, an unliquidated set-off
against the subcontractor; and (4) the subcontractor's claim arose from
matters not attributable to the termination of the prime contract. An
analysis of these four difficulties encountered in the settlement of subcontracts will serve to illuminate the background and environment giving
rise to those termination agreements which are incomplete as to subcontract claims.
First, consider the simple case of an immediate subcontractor who presents an excessive claim. The prime contractor after some investigation
makes a determination that the claim is high, and upon reaching this
conclusion, instead of promptly approving the charges for payment, sends
an expeditor to the subcontractor's plant to straighten out the difficulty.
After reasonable efforts, and especially if the contracting agency is urging
immediate action, the prime passes the problem on to the Government
representative in charge of the settlement of the prime contract. Doubting
the claim, the prime contractor of course refuses to execute the usual
certificate that it is fair and reasonable and not more favorable to the
subcontractor than if reimbursement by the Government were not involved.27 Failure to certify the claim is an automatic red flag to the Government negotiator, so he calls for an office review of the claim by an au27 Joint

Termination Regulation (8-io-45) para. 632.
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ditor. If it is believed the charges are padded, a more detailed field audit
may be requested. After the facts are assembled by the auditor, the negotiator normally attempts to arrange a meeting with both the prime contractor and the subcontractor in the hope that the difficulty can be ironed
out. All of this takes time, and the further down the contractual chain the
subcontractor is the more time it takes. If other parts of the prime contractor's claim are agreed upon and it appears that the subcontract claim
cannot be closed within a reasonable time, the tendency has been to close
the prime contract and reserve the delayed issue for future settlement.
A substantial portion of the excessive claims filed by subcontractors
has been the product of inexperience. In spite of the efforts of the Smaller
War Plants Corporation and the various training teams sponsored by the
Government termination organizations, many subcontractors operating
small businesses have not become familiar with termination regulations.
Even though these subcontractors had access to training courses and termination literature, they generally did not employ accounting and legal
specialists or negotiating talent charged with the responsibility of keeping
informed as to termination developments. Contractors who have dealt
directly with the Government generally have had numerous terminations,
and so by actual experience have gained facility in termination operations and knowledge of termination rules. Moreover, these companies
have had the advantage of securing much of their information at first
hand from Government negotiators thoroughly conversant with the
gamut of practical termination problems. Because of this experience prime
contractors have made great strides forward in reducing the number of
excessive claims and eliminating the few padded ones. The reports of the
Office of Contract Settlement show that prior to June 3o, 1944, termina-

tions of fixed price contracts involving charges were settled for 8o per
cent of the amount originally claimed by the contractors;28 while in June
of 1945, such claims were being settled for 92 per cent of the amount
initially requested.29 This difference undoubtedly reflects increased accuracy in the presentation of claims by prime contractors and greater familiarity with termination regulations.
Of the many excessive claims filed by subcontractors due to inexperience, most have been adjusted without delaying the complete closing of
the prime contract terminations. On the other hand, a type of "excessive"
28 First Report (War Contract Termihations and Settlements) by the Director of Contract
Settlement to the Congress, October, x944, Appendix C, Table i, p. 3c.
29 Fourth Report (War Contract Terminations and Settlements) by the Director of Contract Settlement to the Congress, July, 1945, Appendix B, p. 39.
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claim which repeatedly has resulted in reservations in the termination
settlement of prime contracts is that arising because the subcontractor
insisted upon taking advantage of all legal rights under his subcontract
or purchase order-which often permitted him to claim amounts in excess
of those allowable under Government termination regulations. Such contentions are possible because of the lack of uniformity among contractual
termination arrangements in subcontracts.
Although a uniform termination article for use in subcontracts was
recommended by the Government in May of 1944,30 this was too late to

secure general adoption. Most contractors had worked out their own forms
and were not eager to change. Many of the forms in use were an adaptation of the uniform termination article for fixed price supply contracts
with the Government, and therefore similar to the recommended article
for use in subcontracts. Numerous purchase orders and subcontracts outstanding at the end of the war, however, contained either no provision for
termination or provisions permitting claims in excess of amounts allowable under accepted Government termination principles. The vast majority of subcontractors have not attempted to press these rights against
their customers to the legal limit, but it is nevertheless true that the lack
of standard legal arrangements permits an area for disagreement which
might have been avoided had a uniform subcontract termination article
been in use.
Typical of the problems which might have been avoided by better
termination provisions in subcontracts are the disputes concerning the
allowability of anticipated profit. Under the common law, profit which
a contractor would have made had he completed the contract is generally
a proper element of damages for breach of contract, provided the profit
is demonstrable and not speculative. 3y The Government, however, is
firmly committed to a policy of paying a profit only on work done ..

From

a time early in the war the termination articles in prime contracts have
provided that where settlement is by formula, a reasonable profit will be
allowed exclusively on costs actually incurred under the contract.3 3 If a
prime contractor demanded anticipated profit, he could be forced to a
formula settlement, an alternative that scarcely any contractors have
3o Directive Order 6 of the Office of War Mobilization, dated May 29, I944. See also Office of
Contract Settlement Regulation No. 6, contained in Joint Termination Regulation (4-20-45)
p. 2526.
s, 5 Williston, Contracts §§ 1299, 1345, 1346 (rev. ed. 1936).
32 Joint Termination Regulation (8-10-45) para. 533-1.
33 Joint

Termination Regulation (4-20-45) para. 931.
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wished to face. The contracting agencies hoped that the same principle
would be incorporated into all purchase orders and subcontracts, and
when a recommended form of subcontract article was issued by the Government it contained such a provision. 34 In addition, when claims for
anticipated profit arose under subcontracts containing no corresponding
limitation the Government announced that claims for unearned profit
would be reimbursed only when and if they were reduced to judgment. 5
Thus far all claims presented to the Chicago Ordnance District by subcontractors for anticipated profit have been rejected. In at least one instance, insistence upon the full profit required the exclusion of the particular subcontract claim from the settlement with the prime contractor.
One year later the subcontractor in that case consented to settle in accordance with accepted principles for computation of profit, having threatened
for eleven months that he would carry the matter to court but in the end
abandoning his point. By and large the cases decisively show that the
claims for anticipated profit, as well as other claims which might be legally
enforceable under the terms of particular termination articles but which
are in excess of fair compensation and reasonable profit under the terms of
the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, are used principally as negotiating
weapons to assist subcontractors in positioning themselves for favorable
settlements. In the last analysis the overwhelming majority of businessmen have been willing to abide by the rules which have been adopted
nationally.
The second general reason subcontract claims were reserved in termination settlements prior to V-J Day was delay in presentation of the claims.
Sometimes the most earnest efforts by higher-tier contractors failed to
secure timely presentation of subcontractors' claims.- 6 With primary emphasis on production, there was considerable inertia retarding the preparation and filing of claims by contractors not dealing directly with the
Government. In some cases, moreover, the very remoteness of subcontractors from the prime contractor made it impossible to settle a dispute
34 See note 30, supra.
3SJoint Termination Regulation (8-1o-45) para. 625.1.

36 This fact is forcefully illustrated by the following excerpt from a letter written by a Chicago Ordnance District prime contractor to one of his subcontractors whose claim had been
excepted from the prime's settlement with the Government. "As long as we are handling this
matter, we will endeavor to administer the claim fairly, having regard to any contractual rights
of the parties and any rights arising out of the Contract Settlement Act. However, our own
contract with the Government was terminated nearly a year ago, and when we tell you that if
we are to administer this claim we expect to have it filed within thirty days, we are not 'arbitrarily imposing a thirty day limitation.' We do not believe that it is either customary fair
business or Government practice to permit matters such as this to drag along indefinitely."
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between subs as quickly as the claim of the prime. It must be remembered
that basically settlements follow the contractual chain: the Government
deals with the prime contractor; the prime deals with his subcontractor;
and the sub deals with his sub-subcontractor. Even at best it takes time
for termination notices to travel down the contractual line and for claims
to come back up. The time available to lower-tier contractors to settle
claims must be somewhat less than that available to primes if all contracts in a hierarchy are to be closed when the prime settlement is
reached. With shorter deadlines for settlements of prime contracts the
problem of getting claims and settlements up the chain on time increases.
As a corollary to this matter of speed, legal complications are foreseeable in the case where there has been unreasonable delay in passing termination notices down the line. After receipt of notice of termination the
prime contractor, under his contract with the Government, is obligated
to terminate his orders and subcontracts; and it is contemplated that termination notices shall be passed to lower-tier contractors as rapidly as
practicable. If any subcontractor continues work after the time a termination notice should have been received, neither he nor any higher-tier
contractor is entitled to compensation or reimbursement from the Government for that work&? Where the Government will not be financially responsible for the extra work performed, the subcontractor nevertheless
may have a perfectly good claim against his customer who failed to give
8
notice of termination promptly.
The third circumstance which prior to V-J Day gave rise to subcontract reservations in termination settlements was delay in reaching an
agreement with the subcontractor because of the existence of unliquidated
set-offs in favor of the next-higher-tier contractor. Many subcontractors
had limited financial resources, especially when considered in the light of
the extensive expansion necessary to meet wartime production requirements. Whereas prime contractors ordinarily looked to the Government
for financial support or had established financial connections through
which sizable loans could be secured, the subcontractor frequently was
forced to rely on his customer for additional capital. In many cases the
customer advanced money to the subcontractor. In some cases the customer furnished facilities to the subcontractor. Frequently engineering
assistance was provided.
37 A review made by the Government shortly after V-J Day of the flow of termination
notices to several major subcontractors indichted the possibility that some higher-tier contractors may have unnecessarily delayed cancellation of their purchase orders and subcontracts in
certain instances. Army Service Forces Circular No. 338, September 7, 1945.
39 Joint Termination Regulation (6-20-45) para. 251.3.
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Many of these dependent subcontractors were not the best producers.
Some were "war babies" with few experienced persons in their organizations. Others were established peacetime companies attempting to produce items entirely foreign to their usual lines. A considerable number
were marginal producers to whom the war had given another lease on
life. A sizable group of companies in all these classes failed in production
or produced few acceptable items, while turning out great quantities
which were rejected for failure to comply with Government specifications.
Not infrequently the customers accepted the defective material and reworked it in order to have necessary parts in time.
As terminations came to these inferior producers, the occasion for
reckoning with their customers also arrived. With managements concentrating on production rather than the financial situation, the fringe
companies sometimes had failed to appreciate the extent of the various
claims which the customers held and which had not been pressed perhaps because of a desire not to jeopardize further the subcontractors'
production. With the full presentation of such set-offs against a subcontractor's termination claim, hard feelings occasionally resulted. In a few
cases the parties reached the stage where they were hardly on speaking
terms. Anticipating the set-offs, the subcontractor sometimes made his
claim as high as he thought possible, and, invariably, the hard-fisted customer rebeled at paying proportionately more on termination to the inefficient and expensive producer than to top-notch suppliers. Under these
circumstances negotiations frequently have been slow, and it has been
necessary to except from the prime settlement the unsettled liabilities
arising out of the tangled relationship.
The fourth kind of disagreement observed prior to V-J Day occurred
when a subcontractor asserted a claim arising from matters not attributable to the termination or modification of the prime contract. A reasonable number of finished items in the plant of the subcontractor at the time
of termination are proper elements of a termination claim and may be
included at the subcontract price,3 9 but an open account for items delivered prior to termination and for which the subcontractor has not been
paid do not form a proper part of a termination claim.4o Similarly, claims
for an increased price for finished units delivered prior to termination and
arising from a change in specifications do not constitute proper termination charges.4' To adopt any other position would not only result in the
39 joint Termination
40 Ibid.,

41 Ibid.

Regulation (8-Io-45) para. 541..

para. 541.2 and 541.3.
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Government's paying again in a termination settlement for part of the
cost of the finished items for which it previously had paid the prime contractor, but would also make the Government a guarantor of every credit
risk subcontractors might have taken under a terminated war contract.
More than one subcontractor, however, has insisted upon including these
improper elements in his termination settlement proposal, with the result that agreement could not easily be reached.
Another difficulty of this type can be illustrated by a case which the
Chicago Ordnance District recently considered. A large prime contractor
cancelled a purchase order issued to one of his suppliers because in his
opinion the supplier was in default. Subsequently, the prime's contract
was terminated. In the settlement of this termination, rights of the defaulted subcontractor were excepted because of disagreement between the
parties. Thereafter the facts were investigated by the Government in order
to determine whether the claim being asserted by the subcontractor could
be considered as proper for reimbursement. It was stressed in behalf of
the subcontractor that the Contract Settlement Act authorizes not only
the settlement of claims for a termination but also the settlement of any
other claims arising under a terminated war contract.
As pointed out by the subcontractor, section 3 (h) of the act defines
"termination claim" as "any claim or demand by a war contractor for
fair compensation for the termination of any war contract and any other
claim under a terminated war contract, which regulations prescribed under this Act authorize to be asserted and settled in connection with any
termination settlement." However, section 3 (d) of the act states that the
words "termination," "terminate," and "terminated" refer to "the termination or cancellation, in whole or in part, .... of work under a subcontract for any reason except the default of the subcontractor." It is therefore clear that the phrase "termination claim" does not include a claim
arising out of the termination of a purchase order because of the subcontractor's own default.
Although this may appear elementary, it is not so easily understood by
the subcontractor who has received notice of a default termination a few
days prior to a general termination of war contracts for the convenience
of the Government. He may well feel that to deny reimbursement of his
claim is discriminatory. Yet under the Contract Settlement Act and the
regulations issued pursuant to it the contracting agency has no other
choice. If the subcontractor persists in asserting his claim, a reservation
in the prime settlement agreement becomes likely.
The above analysis of reasons for subcontract reservations is based
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upon a study of terminated contracts settled prior to the surrender of
Japan, and accordingly does not fully reflect the peculiar conditions existing at the time of mass terminations of war contracts. With V-J Day, the
program for speedy terminations was stepped up. Primary emphasis was
shifted from production to terminations. The great pressure to settle
quickly thousands of terminations occurring simultaneously had obvious
effects upon delaying subcontract settlements. To the existing difficulties
of settling subcontracts new ones were added.
Many subcontractors were faced with the problem of filing their first
termination claims. Some had never had a contract terminated; others
previously had absorbed any termination costs without filing claims. For
a large group the time had come to "sweep the celar"-nothing was to be
overlooked in their final claims. Many times in the past it had been possible to divert inventory to other jobs, and frequently there had been advance warning of terminations. Terminations at the end of the war came
suddenly and left few opportunities to run out inventory on hand.
When these war-end terminations came, there was no further opportunity for preparation in settlement procedures and many subcontractors
were still unprepared. Shortly before V-J Day the Director of Contract
Settlement reported that a survey covering a sample of contractors with
fewer than 4oo employees revealed that 25 per cent of these smaller contractors were only partially prepared or were entirely unprepared for
termination.42 While over 85 per cent of subcontract cancellations were
being settled without claim a short time before the conclusion of hostilities
in Europe, 43 with the end of the war in all theaters and the prospect of
greatly reduced business, many subcontractors for the first time were confronted with the problem of settling numerous terminations with charges,
some of a complex nature, relying on organizations relatively uninformed
as to the rules of the game.
Another factor affecting subcontract settlements after V-J Day was
the changed position of Government personnel. Prior to that time many
Government termination negotiators assisted considerably in working out
subcontractor difficulties. Where the Ordnance Department was on notice
that a controversy existed, even between a remote subcontractor and an
intermediate contractor with whom the Government had no privity of
contract, the negotiator might intercede, ordinarily at the r-equest of one
42 Fourth Report (War Contract Terminations and Settlements) by the Director of Contract Settlement to the Congress, July, 1945, p. 12.
43Third Report (War Contract Terminations and Settlements) by the Director of Contract
Settlement to the Congress, April, 1945, p. 4.
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of the parties, to assist in reaching a speedy adjustment of the differences.
Normally such informal arbitration quickly disposed of disputes. Following V-J Day, however, Government negotiators had their desks piled
high with prime contract termination problems, and had little opportuiity
to straighten out kinks in the contractual chain.
Since V-J Day it has also become apparent that a very substantial
number of subcontract reservations arise in connection with the policy
of interdistrict subcontract delegations. In the Ordnance Department, as
well as in other services, termination responsibilities have been largely decentralized to district offices. These districts have reached an understanding that the district administering a terminated prime contract may delegate the negotiation of a subcontract claim to the district in which the
subcontractor is located. The Chicago Ordnance District, for example, to
September 1, 1945, had received 816 such delegations from other districts and had made 98o delegations. If this process of delegation functioned perfectly, it would not lead to reservations in the prime settlement
agreements. The district receiving the delegation would negotiate the
subcontract claim promptly and report an approved settlement amount
to the prime district in time for inclusion in the settlement agreement with
the prime contractor. In practice, however, delegated claims have not
always been adjusted by the date the prime district is ready to close its
deal-and consequently a considerable number of the delegated claims
have been reserved.
The impact of all these additional factors which became evident after
V-J Day points to an increase in the reservation of subcontract matters
in termination settlements. At this writing the Chicago Ordnance District has settled very few of the more complicated terminations effectuated
atV-J Day, so the full force of the added considerations has not been felt.43a
Nevertheless, these factors, along with the augmented pressure to close
terminations, already has enlarged the relative number of incomplete
termination settlements. Of the settlement agreements presented to the
review board of the Chicago Ordnance District during September, 1945,
44
50 per cent reserved from the settlement one or more subcontract claims.
As an outgrowth of the demand for speed in termination settlements,
there seem to be two potential sources for future trouble. The first, con43

a In one of the first large terminations settled after V-J Day (and after the text of this article was prepared) claims of 3o subcontractors were excepted from the prime settlement agreement.
44 Proposed termination settlements involving over $25,ooo are submitted to the Settlement
Review Board of the Chicago Ordnance District.
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cerning which signs already have appeared, is that the claims of some
subcontractors will have been disregarded or forgotten in the rush to close
settlements of prime contracts. Having entered into mutual releases with
the*Government, the prime contractors in these cases might well be cold
to any propositions of the excluded subcontractors. More than one prime
contractor in this situation has bluntly told the subcontractor to file suit
and wait for a judgment. As a result, the contracting agency may
be confronted with the plea under section 7(f) of the Contract
Settlement Act that "equity and good conscience require fair compensation for the termination of a war contract to be paid to a subcontractor
who has been deprived of and cannot otherwise reasonably secure such
fair compensation." In cases of this nature the Chicago Ordnance District has taken the position that direct payment to the subcontractor will
not be considered unless the higher-tier war contractor is bankrupt or
insolvent. 4s However, where other unusual circumstances exist, the service
involved may consider reopening the prime settlement, under the principles discussed in the final section of this article, in order to permit reimbursement of the excluded claim.
The second and probably more frequent source of future difficulties will
be the subcontract problems recognized in and reserved from termination
settlements. A contracting agency cannot consider a terminated contract
completely closed until such reservations have been cleared up; and in
many cases the excepted subcontract matters involve complexities. An
unusual illustration of the possibilities for complications existing after
execution of a prime settlement agreement was exhibited in connection
with the termination of a large contract for carbines settled by the Chicago Ordnance District. As the time for settlement approached two subcontractors, both controlled by the same interests, were in violent disagreement with the prime contractor. To avert delay in closing the prime
settlement, Ordnance Department representatives intervened actively, in
the hope that some form of mediation would expedite agreement. The
Government representatives failed to bring the parties together, and in
the final negotiation the prime contractor was indemnified against further
liability to these two suppliers. Attorneys for the subcontractors immediately, appealed to Ordnance personnel for direct payment of their
45In the event payment is made by the Government to a subcontractor whose customer is
insolvent or bankrupt, questions arise (i) as to whether a voidable preference results from such
payment, and (2) as to the position of the Government as a claimant in the estate of the bankrupt customer in those cases where the Government has taken an assignment of the termination claim of the subcontractor. See Op. Judge Advocate General, SPJGC I944/r2685; Op.
Att. Gen. of the United States, dated May xg, 1945.
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clients' claims, citing the objectives of the Contract Settlement Act as
reasons why the Government was required to deal directly with the subcontractors. Upon failing to secure payments directly from the Government, the subcontractors then submitted their cases to the Appeal Board
of the Office of Contract Settlement without the consent of the prime
contractor 46 and without the specific assumption of the claims by the
Government. 47 The Appeal Board concluded its opinion by stating:
In neither the Kal nor the Precision case is there proof that the contracting agency
undertook to make direct settlement or accepted responsibility therefor under Section
7(d). On the contrary, the memorandum agreements of November 24, 1944 provided
that, subject to approval by the Ordnance Award Board the prime contractor was au-

thorized to pay the respective agreed amounts. It is true that the Government did endeavor, by negotiating directly with the subcontractors, to facilitate agreements between the prime contractor and the subcontractors, but this was done because of the
impasse between the parties and in order to expedite complete settlement of the prime
contract. In conducting these negotiations, the Government was merely discharging

the duties imposed by Section 6 to~provide speedy and fair compensation for war contractors, and by Section 20(f) to advise, aid and assist contractors in preparing and
presenting termination claims. Such acts of assistance did not make the Government
"responsible for settling appellants" claims, within the meaning of Section 13(a) so as
8
to give a right of appeal.4

In establishing the principle that the intervention of Government
representatives in an informal manner does not give a subcontractor the
right to assert a claim directly against the Government, 49 the decision of
the Appeal Board provides a firm foundation to the practice of informal
arbitration by termination negotiators. Even so, this practice probably
46See section I3 (f)(1) of the Contract Settlement Act of i944; rule 12 of Office of Contract
Settlement Regulation No. 15, contained in joint Termination Regulation (4-2o-45) p. 2549.
47See section 7(d) of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944; rule 4 of Office of Contract
Settlement Regulation No. i5,contained in joint Termination Regulation (8-io-45) p.

2548-D.
48 Predsion Metal & Machine Co. v. War Department; Kal Machine Works, Inc. v. War

Department, Office of Contract Settlement Appeal Board, Proceeding Nos. 8 and 9,August 6,
X945, CCH War Law Service, 3 CCF ioox.
49The difficulties of taking any other position are easily illustrated. For example, assume
that a dispute exists between a first-tier subcontractor and a prime contractor. The subcontractor appeals directly to the Appeal Board of the Office of Contract Settlement, but the
prime contractor does not give his consent to the appeal. When the hearing takes place the
subcontractor and the Government will be represented. Unless it is found that the Government has assumed the subcontract claim and is obligated to settle it directly, the derision of
the Appeal Board cannot be conclusive. The prime contractor is the party against whom the
right to recover exists and the prime contractor is not a party to the appeal proceedings. In
order to hold the prime contractor liable, the issues in the case would have to be submitted de
novo to the courts, for there would be no basis for enforcing a judgment of the Appeal Board
against a party who had not been represented before the Board. This is especially clear in the
frequent case where the prime contractor and subcontractor are in disagreement over amounts
due or overpaid on the completed portion of the supply contract.
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will not be an adequate mechanism to cope with all the complicated subcontract matters likely to be reserved in termination settlements. In the
first place, after the initial rush of V-J Day termination settlements is
past and it is again possible for Government representatives to turn their
attention to these vexatious subcontract cases, many of the more able and
experienced negotiators will have returned to private business. Since a
substantial number of the reserved cases undoubtedly will involve personality difficulties and strained feelings between the parties, the prospective lack of tactful negotiators increases the likelihood that some of these
deferred cases may end up in the courts.
In the second place, whether the contracting agency excepts the deferred subcontract matter from the prime-settlement agreement, or assumes the subcontract claim for direct settlement by the Government,
the position of the contracting agency often is not wholly satisfactory.
Where the contracting agency merely excepts the claim from the prime
termination settlement, the Government does not assume responsibility
for the settlement, and the burden of taking further action rests on the
prime contractor. The prime thereafter may not be greatly concerned
about speedy settlement of the reserved subcontract since he will have received all the money he is entitled to by way of the prime settlement.
Thus, it may be incumbent upon the contracting agency to exert pressure
upon the prime contractors to clear up these exceptions.
From an operating point of view the assumption of subcontract claims
for direct settlement by the Government provides even greater hazards.
Assumptions not only result in undermining the basic principle that a
terminated contract should be settled through the contractual chain, but
may greatly handicap Government negotiators in later completing deals
with the subcontractors.50 As previously noted, many subcontracts which
cannot be settled promptly involve certain complexities, and if the customer is relieved of all responsibility with respect to these contracts, his
cooperation in attempting to expedite a closure and in providing facts
and figures essential to an equitable settlement may be reduced. In other
words, the danjer inherent in the assumption by the Government of a
claim for direct settlement is that one of the parties responsible for setting
so This discussion contemplates a situation where the Government has assumed responsibility for the determination of the amount due on account of the termination of a subcontract
and the payment of such amount to the subcontractor. However, in some instances the prime
contractor and subcontractor may agree upon the amount of the subcontractor's claim and the
Government merely assumes responsibility for payment. This latter procedure insures prompt
payment to the subcontractor where a finance company holds an assignment of the prime
contractor's contract with the Government. See also Joint Termination Regulation (6-2o-45)
para. 662.2 and note 45, above.
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up and administering the contractual arrangement-the customer-is not
a party to the settlement negotiations. This frequently impedes an intelligent examination and adjustment of the difficulties.
There are, however, several situations in which it is desirable for the
Government to assume and directly settle claims of subcontractors. Direct settlement is required whenever a contracting agency is satisfied that
a higher-tier war contractor is, or is in serious danger of becoming, unable
to meet his obligations; 5' and it is permitted in cases where direct action
is deemed by the Government to be necessary or desirable for expeditious
and equitable settlements.52 Soon after V-J Day, the necessity for direct
settlement of common subcontractors became increasingly apparent. For
example, a supplier may be producing an identical part for as many as
thirty customers located in many parts of the country. Some of the purchasers may deal directly with the Government and others may be intermediate subcontractors. It is usually economical of time and manpower to have a single termination team settle all thirty terminations
rather than require thirty different purchasing agents to work out thirty
separate deals with the common supplier, whose inventories and costs
under the various purchase orders are necessarily commingled. In these
instances the local termination office of the Government frequently will
make arrangements for audit and property disposal in behalf of all of the
higher-tier contractors, and in some cases there would seem to be reason
for the Government to assume and pay the entire claim directly rather
than to require it to be allocated and channeled through the contractual
chains. Generally, the only difficult question presented to the Government, when it assumes a claim of this kind for settlement, is the extent to
which the common subcontractor's costs are properly allocable to war
contracts. This problem tends to become increasingly troublesome the
farther removed the subcontractor is from the prime contractors to whom
his products are eventually delivered.
In explaining the causes of subcontract reservations in termination
settlement agreements, and in noting signs that these will increase, it has
not been intended to disparage all such reservations. On the contrary,
many of these reservations-as in cases revolving about a common subcontractor or insolvent prime contractor-doubtless will be of types
specifically contemplated by the Contract Settlement Act. Such reservations generally are of benefit to the subcontractor involved, since they
avoid multiplication of his work in presenting and settling claims or ins' Joint Termination Regulation (6-20-45) para. 662.3.
S2 Ibid., para. 662.4.
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sure his receiving payment of termination charges. On the other hand,
many reservations-such as those growing out of excessive claims, misunderstandings between customers and suppliers, and disputes involving
rights of set-offs-probably will be based on situations which are aggravated by speedy termination settlements. In these cases the reservation
generally is of no benefit to the subcontractor. Rather, the reservation
may operate further to postpone the ultimate date of settling his claim,
reduce the likelihood of settlement through mutual agreement, and handicap him in receiving prompt payment of his termination charges. Reviewing past cases, it is fair to add that in these situations the subcontractor
whose claim is reserved frequently is in poor financial condition and may
be placed in a disadvantageous position through delay in payment of his
termination claim. Where this result prevails, one of the basic objectives
of the Contract Settlement Act is defeated.
OPEN ISSUES AS TO TEUMINATION INVENTORY

In contrast to the treatment of facilities questions and subcontract
claims in settlement agreements, during the past year no settlement arranged by the Chicago Ordnance District has kept open under the terminated contract any rights or obligations as to inventory resulting from
the termination.53 Standard practice has required that all such inventory,
including raw materials, purchased parts, work in process, finished components, sub-assemblies, and completed items, be accounted for prior to
settlement. In effect this has meant that before the execution of the termination agreement all inventory is counted and checked to determine the
contractor's claim for compensation, and then is sold or retained by the
contractor or transferred to the Government, thus permitting disposal
credits in favor of the Government to be calculated. Even where the contractor has agreed to store thereafter part of the inventory for the Government, all rights and liabilities pertaining to it under the terminated
contract have been settled first. Under these circumstances, no need has
arisen for reserving termination inventory matters from the general re54
lease in termination settlement agreements.
s3 Current regulations define contractor inventory to include Government-owned facilities
(loint Termination Regulation [8-io-45] para. 4oo). As used in this article, however, the term
"inventory" excludes such facilities.
S4In every settlement agreement of the Chicago Ordnance District involving any payment
to the contractor, the parties have agreed in substance that: "All contract and subcontract
termination inventory (including scrap), has been retained, sold, returned to suppliers, stored
for the Government, delivered to the Government, or otherwise properly accounted for, and
all proceeds or retention prices thereof, if any, have been taken into account in arriving at this
agreement."
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Nevertheless, in effecting the disposition of termination inventories
certain new rights and obligations which survive the termination settlement agreement may be created-some between the parties to the terminated contract. These open issues come into existence as part of the overall settlement procedure and in many cases are not a product of speed in
making settlements.
It is to be observed, however, that there is a self-contained fundamental connection between speed in settlements and termination inventory matters. Briefly, as the pace of settlement increases there is a corresponding reduction in the time available for inventories to be disposed of
by contractors directly from their plants. To some extent there is a correlation between the length of this period of time and the quantity of inventory which can be redistributed into commercial channels by contractors.
As a corollary, it follows that as settlements are speeded up, the amount of
inventories turned over by contractors to the Government-and then
placed in warehouses-tends to increase.
These relationships are to be viewed in the perspective of the broadoutlines of the over-all national plan for accomplishing disposition of war surpluses not required by the military establishments. Disposition is initially
to be made by contractors in possession of the inventories, subject to advance or specific approval of the contracting agencies involved. At this
stage retentions by contractors are encouraged and all sales are between
the contractors in possession and the purchasers. The termination article
in prime contracts permits the contracting agencies to direct these sales
by war contractors and, by implication, allows the contracting agencies to
aid in locating buyers and expediting sales.55 All such sales are to be made
in accordance with the rules prescribed by the Surplus Property Board.
Title to inventories which are not redistributed in this fashion (or abandoned) is then transferred to the contracting agencies. At this second level,
unserviceable property may be sold by the contracting agencies as scrap
or salvage under the regulations of the Surplus Property Board, but in
practice contractors generally will have been previously directed to undertake this function56 Serviceable property at this level, on the other hand,
5sThe uniform termination article for fixed price supply prime contracts provides: "After
receipt of a Notice of Termination and except as otherwise directed by the contracting officer,
the contractor shall.. . use his best efforts to sell in the manner, to the extent, at the time,
and at the price or prices directed or authorized by the contracting officer, any property...
and... may retain any such property at a price or prices approved by the contracting officer;
." Joint Termination Regulation (4-20-45) para. 931.
s6 Contractors of the Chicago Ordnance District are directed to dispose of all unserviceable
property so that the agency does not take title to such inventory.
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is declared as surplus to the disposal agencies designated by the Surplus
Property Board. It is then either shipped directly from contractors' plants
to the disposal agencies or their designees or, pending disposition by these
agencies, is stored by agreement with the contractors in possession or
warehoused elsewhere by the contracting agencies. Ultimately, all of this
serviceable property not needed by the military establishments is turned
over to disposal agencies for disposition-such disposition being the third
57
stage of the redistribution process.
It is within the foregoing framework that the new and surviving issues
concerning termination inventory must be considered. These issues will
be examined in connection with three features commonly associated with
disposition of termination inventories: (i) scrap warranties; (2) use representations; and (3) storage agreements.
The first new issue, that revolving about scrap warranties, affects a
major share of all termination inventory. In general, where scrap in termination inventory is not retained for use by the contractor in possession or
sold on competitive bids, the disposal must be at the best price obtainable
and subject to the following warranty by the purchaser s '
The undersigned represents and warrants to the United States that the property
covered by this agreement was offered as scrap, that he is purchasing or retaining it
only as scrap and that he will sell and ship or use it only as scrap, either in its existing
condition or after further preparation, and only in conformity with all applicable regulations and orders of the Office of Price Administration and the War Production
Board.59
The warranty is furnished to the seller but clearly runs in favor of the
Government.
The function of the scrap warranty is primarily that of a safeguard
against unconscionable windfalls resulting from negotiated sales. Where
property is offered for sale in a wide market and then sold to the highest
bidder at scrap prices, there is small likelihood that the purchaser can resell at an'unreasonably large profit. On the other hand, where material is
sold on a negotiated basis without a public offering, the possibility of undervaluation is greatly increased. This undervaluation may be substantial
only if the material disposed of at scrap prices in fact has use other than
57 A full discussion of this subject is contained in Olverson, Legal Aspects of Surplus War
Property Disposal, 31 Vir. L. Rev. 55o (I945).
S8Joint Termination Regulation (8-io-45) para. 445.5, 446.3 (requiring warranty); 445.4
(not requiring warranty when property is sold on competitive bids); 445.4 (not requiring warranty when property is retained for use); 441 (miscellaneous categories of dispositions not requiring warranty).
s9 Joint Termination Regulation (8-io-45) para. 411.13.
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as scrap. One means which has been employed to guard against other use,
and thus realization of speculative profits, has been to mutilate the property prior to sale and so render it unusable except as scrap. Although such
deliberate destruction undoubtedly will avoid resales at scandalous profits,
it is costly and basically unsound economically. The scrap warranty outlaws speculative resales, but does not compel mutilation of property for
which a use other than as scrap may later be found.
The significance of the use made of scrap warranties is to be appraised
in the light of the sequence of situations following demands for swift plant
clearances. Under existing regulations contracting agencies frequently
have found that serviceable property not retained for use by contractors
in possession cannot be disposed of expeditiously. To sell quantities of such
property, regulations require contractors in possession to advertise the
items at least seven days prior to sale, and the administrative details incident to this procedure usuallyconsume several weeks.6" Moreover, few contractors or contracting agencies have established organizations or market
outlets for accomplishing rapid sales of serviceable property; and, desiring
quick termination settlements, both of these groups have been all the more
reluctant to undertake extensive sales activities. This means in practice
that a large segment of serviceable inventory is slated to be turned over
to the designated disposal agencies. However, with a flood of material
being received, the disposal agencies have tended to discourage further
receipts and often have been slow to provide shipping instructions." This
in turn has placed the contracting agencies in the position of either making
arrangements to store serviceable inventory with contractors in possession or acquiring other warehouse space so as not to delay termination
settlements.
These difficulties of disposing of serviceable property, together with the
evident desires of disposal agency liaison consultants to avoid overburdening the disposal agencies with property of doubtful serviceability, quickly
produce a tendency for contracting agencies to find that inventory is unserviceable. This inclination appears to be given official sanction by the
provision of Surplus Property Board Regulation No. 9 that "unless property affirmatively appears to be serviceable, it shall be considered to be unserviceable. ' '6 2Although this regulation states that unserviceable property
6

* Surplus

Property Board Regulation No. 9,contained in Joint Termination Regulation

(8-1o-45) p. 3020 (§ 8309.12).
61 Surplus Property Board Regulation No. i-Special Order No. 5 (May z, 1945), CCH
Surplus Disposal Law Reporter p. 407.
62 Surplus Property Board Regulation No. 9,contained in Joint Termination Regulation
(8-1o-45) p. 3023 (§ 8309.11).
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means "property that has no reasonable prospect of sale for use," it does
not specify whether the test shall be an objective fair sampling of the
market or a determination based upon the knowledge of administrative
officials. The pressures for speed have favored the latter approach. These
pressures have also largely ruled out salvaging operations necessary to
separate serviceable components from the residual scrap-even though
the components may have a sales value substantially in excess of the
scrap value of the assembled units and the salvaging costs.
Accompanying the leaning to declare inventory unserviceable is a propensity to dispose of such property as scrap. Regulations provide that
(most) sales of unserviceable property "shall be made on the basis of
adequate competitive bidding. '6 3 As a practical matter, bids for this
property are promptly entered by scrap and used machinery dealers,
while other classes of purchasers are either difficult to reach or slow to
present quotations. This limited nature of the market to some extent has
been fostered by the previously noted circumstances that contracting
agencies have not maintained their former contacts with other prospective
purchasers, and contractors in possession have only restricted knowledge
of prospective markets for such property. In this narrow market bids for
unserviceable property tend to approximate current scrap prices. With differentials over and above scrap levels being so small, contracting agencies
have been inclined to permit sales to fall into the scrap category so that
the agencies gain protection through requesting scrap warranties. Although regulations do not require the execution of a scrap warranty where
competitive bids have been secured, the Chicago Ordnance District, like
many other contracting agencies, asks for the warranty in almost all sales
at scrap prices.
The last step in the sequence affecting the use of scrap warranties is for
contracting agencies to expedite sales of unserviceable property through
eliminating time-consuming competitive bidding and substituting sales
by negotiation. Regulations prescribe that in exceptional cases the requirement of competitive bidding may be waived where it "would be in
the best interests of the Government" to dispose of unserviceable property
by negotiated sale at the best price obtainable-provided the buyer furnishes a scrap warranty.64 To date a wide variety of circumstances have
provided justification for such negotiated sales.
Thus, the cumulative tendencies act to funnel a large portion of termination inventories under the continuing obligations of the scrap warranty.
63Ibid.
64Joint Termination Regulation (8-io-45) para. 445.5 and 446.3.
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The essence of the obligation imposed by the scrap warranty is that the
property purchased by the warrantor cannot be sold, shipped, or used by
him other than as scrap. This obligation, running directly to the 'Government, is unlimited in time but does not extend to subsequent purchasers.
Unlike the irrevocable consequences of mutilating material to secure protection against resales for other than scrap uses at unconscionable profits,
the warrantor may divert the property to more economic uses upon securing a release of the warranty. This release may be obtained from the Government by payment to the Government of the difference between the
amount for which the property was purchased as scrap and its present
value for use other than scrap. Relatively few releases have been sought
from the Chicago Ordnance District to date. In part this may be explained
by the fact that a large share of purchases under warranty have been
made by scrap dealers who under pressure usually channelled their entire
stock to industrial consumers of scrap. But with the end of the war and
more classes of items in termination inventories being sold as scrap under
warranty, the efforts to reclaim serviceable components for use other than
scrap may increase.
Breach of the scrap warranty certainly is remediable by usual contract
damages, and it appears that the violator may also incur civil or criminal
penalties. Contract damages, measured by the amount required to secure
a release of the warranty from the Government, would be recoverable regardless of the circumstances surrounding the breach. If the breach were
intentional, appropriate punitive damages might be added into the assessment. It seems, however, that criminal punishment could not be administered unless the warrantor possessed a fraudulent intent at the time
of executing the warranty.6S Likewise, the quasi-criminal penalties prescribed in section i9(c) of the Contract Settlement Act appear appropriate
only if the warrantor intentionally misrepresented his purposes in accomplishing the warranty.
As a practical matter the policing and enforcement of either the civil or
the criminal liability would be difficult. Contracting agencies at the present time are making no effort to police scrap warranties. While in a number of cases responsible purchasers have secured releases of the scrap warranty, other buyers, either intentionally or unintentionally, may have
overlooked this precaution. It is conceivable that some agency may be
delegated the task of policing these warranties in the postwar period.
That this job will be onerous, and probably fruitless in proportion to the
expense involved, is almost a certainty. But it is likewise almost a cer6S 52 Stat. 197 (I938), 18 U.S.C.A. § 8o (Supp. 1944).
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tainty that a few scandalous violations of the scrap warranty will come to
light, and the warrantors guilty of making exorbitant profits on items
purchased as scrap may be subjected to litigation accompanied by distasteful publicity.
The second new issue frequently created by disposition of termination
inventory concerns the so-called "use representation," which currently
takes the following form:
The undersigned represents to the United States that the material covered by this
agreement is retained or purchased by him for his manufacturing, construction, maintenance, or repair purposes and that he intends to use or consume the material for said
purposes, and that he is not retaining or purchasing
the material with the intention of
66
reselling it in its existing form at a profit.
This representation is a by-product of the national policy of encouraging
contractors to retain their termination inventories for use. Such retentions keep inventories from becoming additional excess goods awaiting an
ultimate user, and also eliminate costly and burdensome transportation
and warehousing activities. From the standpoint of the national economy,
retention for use probably is the most desirable form of disposition.
Being so advantageous, the Surplus Property Board has provided that
a retention for use may be made at the best price obtainable without resorting to advertising or the securing of competitive bids. 7 In practice,
the determination of what is the best price obtainable is usually based
upon either a sampling of the market or the judgment of personnel in the
contracting agencies. With respect to many classes of items, the disposal
personnel have, through past experience in redistribution work, built up
standards representing their appraisals of going market prices. To a large
degree"best price obtainable" has come to mean a price not unreasonably
lower than these standards. The use representation, in effect, is the authorization to apply such standards rather than the more rigorous test
furnished by active bidding in an open market.
The drive for speedy termination settlements, limiting the time for inventory dispositions by contractors, has caused contracting agencies to
66Joint Termination Regulation (8-io-45) para. 411.19. Prior to mid-year x945, the standard use representation required by the Chicago Ordnance District was as follows: "The purchaser represents and warrants to the United States that he will use or consume this property
in the United States for manufacturing, construction, maintenance, or repair purposes and
agrees that if he does not so use or consume it that he will not resell it at a profit." This clause
creates rights and obligations similar to those under the current scrap warranty. The change
over to the less stringent present form of use representation served to encourage retentions for
use. Inasmuch as contractors sometimes are uncertain regarding the type and extent of the
use to which inventory can be put, there was reluctance to make continuing commitments
as to use.
67 Surplus Property Board Regulation No. 9, contained in Joint Termination Regulation
(8-10-45) p. 3022 (sec. 8309.8).
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encourage contractors to retain inventories subject to use representations.68 These retentions may be arranged quickly without time consuming advertising and competitive bidding. Moreover, since retentions for
use are at the best price obtainable, the contracting agency is not required
to determine formally whether the retained property is serviceable or unserviceable. 69 The additional voluminous paper work attendant upon
storage or shipment of the property is also avoided. On top of all these
advantages is the consideration that the contracting agency runs little
risk of being accused of sacrificing the inventory at an unconscionably low
price. Specifically, since the retention is for use, there should be no subsequent resale of the property at a scandalous profit.
If there is any undesirable effect of excessive speed in connection with
retentions for use, it is that contracting agencies might become careless in
comparing retention offers with prices obtainable on the open market.
Looseness of this nature, however, is not apt to be demonstrated except
in regard to commodities for which there are established markets or recognized trade quotations. By the same token, it is on these articles that contracting agencies will have the most accurate price information. Whatever looseness results from speed probably will occur in retentions of nonstandard items; for these, ascertainment of the actual best price obtainable would require a broad canvas of potential markets.
Chicago Ordnance District contractors have retained millions of dollars worth of inventory under use representations, and, like scrap warranties, no effort has been made to police these representations. Questions
have been raised as to the duration of the obligations imposed upon contractors by use representations. In contrast to the scrap warranty, the
use representation purports to relate only to the intention of the contractor at the moment of executing the representation. Construed strictly, the
representation apparently would not preclude the giver from changing his
mind and deciding to sell the retained material at a profit any time after
making the representation. Some latitude seemingly was intended in so
far as no procedure has been authorized for procuring the release of a use
representation. Established manufacturers should encounter no difficulties
in later deciding to sell at a profit the property they retained subject to a
use representation; but "war babies" continued for the purpose of speculating in war surpluses may face trouble in proving their good faith under
otherwise similar circumstances.
68 It should also be observed that the very existence of the use warranty device in part
stemmed from the desire for speedy termination settlements.
69Joint Termination Regulation (8-io-45) para. 445.3.
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The third open issue related to disposition of termination inventories
concerns storage agreements in which the contractor agrees to store at his
plant inventory which he has conveyed to the Government as part of the
settlement. In this way the contracting agencies may be relieved of having
to store the property elsewhere. This arrangement eliminates unnecessary
transportation, and may alleviate overcrowding in Government warehouses while the military establishment decides whether it requires the
material or until the disposal agencies are ready to make space available.
To date all such storage agreements executed by the Chicago Ordnance
District have been substantially the same as warehouse arrangements
made with third parties not having terminated contracts. As of the time
when these agreements are~executed, no questions relating to compensation of the contractor for having acquired the property for war production,
or disposal credits in favor of the Government, or transfer of title to the
Government, remain open with respect to the property covered. The issues
which do arise after settlement involve the liability of the contractor for
shortages from the quantities stated in the agreements. These stated quantities are based upon the check of inventories which is part of the termination settlement-and these checks are generally upon a selective basis.
The storage agreements permit variances within" commercial tolerances,"
but the inaccuracies of the selective check may result in discrepancies
which exceed normal commercial tolerances and thus cause the quantities
stated in the storage agreement to be erroneous. Often in a case of this
nature it is difficult to determine whether or not the shortage was caused
by the contractor's failure to exercise the standard of care required by the
storage agreement. Upon the resolution of this question rests the determi70
nation of the contractor's liability.

Despite the difficulties of administering these storage agreements (and
the added clerical work entailed in their preparation), contracting agencies might have to make wholesale use of them in order to avoid delaying
settlements of the mass V-J Day terminations. A storage agreement with
a contractor is a stop-gap controlling the rights of the parties as to termi70oIbid. (4-20-45) para. 97z.2. Records of the Chicago Ordnance District through September is, 1945 show that in at least 28 cases shortages of inventory held by contractors under
storage agreements exceeded the "tolerance constituting reasonable limits in accordance with
good commercial inventory practice."
Where the termination inventory placed in storage exceeds the quantities stated in the
storage agreement, the Government nevertheless may assert title to the "overage" by virtue
of the termination settlement agreement relating to the inventory.
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nation inventory during the period between the date a termination settlement is concluded and the date on which the last item of termination inventory is removed from the contractor's plant. In essence, storage agreements fill the gap left when the speed of settlements outstrips the rate of
plant clearances. Should any factor retard clearances--as, for example, inability of the designated disposal agencies to provide shipping instructions
-contracting agencies probably will urge storage arrangements upon contractors. As settlement speed increases and Government warehouses are
filled, the task of promptly clearing plants becomes more aggravated and
there may be a corresponding enlargement in the use of storage agreements. If the speed of settlements precludes extensive prior selective verification of termination inventories by Governmhent personnel, the administration of these storage agreements might involve many complexities in determining the liability of contractors for inventory discrepancies
later discovered.
The repeated references which have been made in this section to the
pressures for speed in settling terminations might leave the impression
that contractors have taken the lead in pressing for this speed. The fact
is, however, that since V-J Day the Government has been the primary
sponsor of an accelerated settlement pace in order to facilitate reconversion. 71 It is obviously advantageous to both the Government and contractors that settlements be completed before the services of experienced Government personnel are lost through the demobilization process. To conform with the national policy, after victory over Japan many contracting
agencies speeded up the wartime settlement tempo by means of master
timetables which scheduled certain numbers of terminations to be closed
during each of the last four calendar months of 1945. These schedules were
not predicated upon the actual receipt of inventory submissions or plant
clearance requests from contractors; consequently, to the extent that contractors are slow in furnishing inventory lists, the task of the contracting
agencies becomes more difficult. First returns in the Chicago Ordnance
District have indicated how the monthly target system has expedited
closures. Legal details, for example, are not permitted to consume time;
and in order to equal or better the "bogey" for a given month it may be
necessary to complete the preparation and execution of numerous settlement contracts in the last few days of the period. The fertility of the control plan is reflected in the figures that, of 3o9 settlement agreements reduced to definitive instruments by the Legal Division of the District dur71See Army Service Forces Circular No.338, September 7, 1945.
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ing September, 1945, 206 were written and executed in the last seven working days of the month 1711
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF, MISTAKES, AND FRAUD

While a large portion of war contractors are concerned in termination
proceedings with Government-owned facilities, subcontracts, and inventories, relatively few, fortunately, are troubled with situations involving
fraud, mistakes, or need for extraordinary relief related to contract terminations. These latter matters, however, can be expected to follow in the
train of a large war-procurement program. Although they have arisen to
some extent during the war, by their very nature they are primarily part
of the aftermath. Speedy termination settlements may affect the solution
of the extraordinary relief cases and possibly increase the number of mistake and fraud situations.
During the war, contractors grew to look upon the contracting agencies
as "benevolent partners" in their wartime ventures. In large measure this
attitude was fostered by the prevalence of well-cushioned profit margins
and, in the infrequent cases where unanticipated risks narrowed these
margins or threatened losses, by the availability of extraordinary relief under
the First War Powers Act and Executive Order 9OO. Within a week after
V-J Day this form of special relief was largely cut off, but the provisions
of section 17 of the Contract Settlement Act continued to provide a means
of redress in cases where contractors had done work in reliance upon apparent authority of Government agents without having secured the coverage of binding written contracts. 72 Although contractors had become
acquainted with extraordinary relief during the war, the mass contract
terminations at the cessation of hostilities acted to focus attention upon
the relationship between terminations and requests for special relief.
At the present time there are pending in the Chicago Ordnance District
a number of cases for relief in connection with terminated contracts. The
requested relief is of the type which may be granted under section 17 of the
Contract Settlement Act, or which previously could have been provided
under Executive Order 9oo. The contracting agencies have been advised
that their discretion does not authorize lumping adjustments of such pleas
for special relief into negotiated termination settlements. As a practical
7a The figures for November, 1945, which became available after the text of this article was
prepared, are even more impressive. Of 341 settlement agreements executed, x04 were signed
the last day of the month!
72For a discussion of relief under Executive Order gooi and section 17 of the Contract
Settlement Act see Kramer, Extraordinary Relief for War Contractors, 93 Univ. of Pa. L.
Rev. 357 (i945).
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matter some contractors may be willing to forego their requests for extraordinary relief, especially if the sum involved is small, in order to expedite the closure of the termination settlements. There appears to be no
objection to this procedure so long as withdrawal of the iequest is not reflected by an increase in the amount paid to the contractor in the settlement. A larger group of contractors, on the other hand, have indicated an
unwillingness to drop their requests for special relief without securing
something in return. These contractors in all probability will insist upon
either postponing settlement of the terminations or expressly reserving
from settlements the possibility of obtaining relief through future private
or public legislation, subsequent administrative measures, or court action.
An interesting illustration of the existing special relief cases is furnished
by a situation resulting from the sudden across-the-board V-J Day terminations. While in the usual case the basis of the request for extraordinary relief does not arise out of a termination, the slash in the procurement
program on V-J Day caught some contractors short because of their wartime practice of proceeding without adequate written authority. For example, two of the largest contractors doing business with the Chicago
Ordnance District had been producing under (informal) letter orders
stating the total quantity of items to be manufactured but placing a ceiling on the amount of money the contractors were authorized to expend or
obligate prior to the execution of formal contracts. In each case the contractor had incurred costs exceeding the specified limit, and with the V-J
Day cut-off authority was lacking to increase the ceiling or execute a
formal contract. Immediately, pleas for special relief under section 17 of
the Contract Settlement Act were submitted. To a large extent these
pleas rest upon the tacit wartime understanding that contractors having
letter orders will proceed to produce the quantities required and that
paper work adjusting fund allocations will catch up. V-J Day terminations
brought a sudden realization to these contractors of the technical limitations of letter orders.
All of the various requests for special relief arising in connection with
terminated contracts raise the question whether an unqualified mutual
release in a settlement agreement forecloses the contractor from later obtaining such relief. The standard release specifically covers "all rights and
liabilities of the parties under the contract and under the [Contract Settlement] Act, in so far as it pertainsto the contract." Inasmuch as special
relief is concerned with payments to which the contractor is not entitled
under the terms of his contract, it may be contended that all payments
by way of special relief do not arise under the contract, but only in con-
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nection with it. Moreover, adopting this view, it further may be urged that
special relief under section 17 of the act is a matter pertaining to the contract only collaterally. Applying this construction, the release may not
preclude assertifhg a plea for extraordinary relief. This approach, however,
seems unrealistically narrow in the light of commonly understood termination-settlement procedures. All signs indicate that contractors and contracting agencies consider a settlement agreement as winding up all unreserved rights and obligations whether arising under or only in connection
with the terminated contract. Since the granting of extraordinary relief
by the Government should rest upon a realistic basis, it is believed that
73
this broader construction of the mutual release is to be preferred.
The occurrence of mistakes in termination settlements and agreements
bears a close relationship to speed in settling contracts. The most common
types of mistakes-clerical errors in settlement agreements and other
failures of such instruments to express the "true agreement between the
parties"-are much more apt to arise under pressure to prepare instruments within short deadlines.7 4 During September, 1945, for example, in
three cases settlement contracts written by the Chicago Ordnance District contained minor deviations from the agreement reached by the parties at the conclusion of negotiations. In relation to the total number of
settlement agreements drafted, these intra-agency mistakes far exceeded
the percentage of similar mistakes in any previous period. Sometimes
errors of this nature are easily detected and corrections merely cause contractors and contracting agencies annoyance and added paper work. On
other occasions, where the record of negotiations is not complete or clear,
considerable time and investigation are required to ascertain the facts and
make certain that the settlement instrument actually does fail to reflect
accurately the negotiated agreement. In any event, a mistake in the written agreement might result in delaying payment of the contractor's termination claim in full until the error has been rectified.
Another class of mistakes which regulations provide may be corrected
by the contracting agencies is designated as being composed of "mutual
mistakes as to material facts." Regulations specifically exclude from this
category errors consisting of the "failure of a contractor to present or to
present accurately, and of the Government to al.ow, a claim based on a
cost incurred by the contractor or on a liability to which the contractor
73Of course,

claims under section x~a of the Contract Settlement Act may arise apart from

any written contract between the Government and the claimant. This is also true in the case
of instructions for continued production beyond the quantity specified in an existing written
contract between the parties.
74See joint Termination Regulation (iO-i r-45) para. 748.3(1)(c).
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was subject, whether by reason of ignorance of such cost or liability or of
its extent or for any other reasons."7 5 As so defined, this mutual mistake
concept would seem to have a very limited application. It is diffcult to
conceive of a mutual mistake of fact to the detriment of the contractor
which would arise for reasons other than his failure "to present or to present accurately" a claim. On the other hand, there is no need for specific
authority to permit the correction of a mutual mistake of fact which is
to the detriment of the Government. Errors of this kind are correctible by
contracting agencies under their broader power to amend any settlement
76
agreement so as to benefit the Government.
Mistakes consisting of the "failure of a contractor to present or present
accurately" a claim for his costs or liabilities pose a problem which goes to
the very foundation of the concept of final settlements of terminated contracts. To allow carte blanche reopening of settlements to correct any such
error would mean that every settlement potentially was partial and tentative. To bar entirely the reopening of settlements in these cases would entail working a severe hardship on contractors even under circumstances
where the equities are heavily in their favor. Consequently, a compromise
has had to be worked out. A contractor's omission may be rectified only
with the approval of the top administrative body of the service involved.
These organizations have adopted the policy that a contractor's failure to
present, or to present accurately, a claim will be repaired only in a very
limited class of cases. A positive commitment of granting relief has been
given only where "it clearly appears that a contractor has been misled to
his substantial detriment by actions of Government personnel on which he
is entitled to rely." Otherwise settlements will be reopened "only in the
most unusual cases. ' 77
Attempts may be made by contractors to predicate the reopening of
final settlement agreements upon the "mistakes" of contracting agencies
in refusing to allow certain components of the contractors' claims. It
might be asserted, for example, that the contracting agency arbitrarily
rejected an item in the claim, perhaps by virtue of an error in applying
regulations. Such circumstances, even if demonstrated, cannot be considered as infusing a mistake into the settlement agreed to by the parties
and formalized in an executed instrument. Regardless of whether the con7s Ibid.
76 Ibid, para. 748.3(7)(a).
77Ibid, para. 748.2. "Adoption of any other policy would cause administrative confusion,
would greatly impair the utility of the negotiated settlement, and would violate the statutory
objective of finality of settlements."
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tracting agency ruled correctly on the disputed element of the claim, the
contractor accepted its decision and carried the settlement through to
completion. The contractor cannot be heard to complain later about the
ruling on any isolated issue which formed part of a negotiated settlement,
inasmuch as the entire "deal" must be considered as a whole and strictness in one aspect may have been offset by liberality in another. If the
contractor felt aggrieved over the strict ruling, he should have objectedand protected his rights-before signing the settlement agreement.
While mistakes in settlements are part of the more immediate aftermath
of contract terminations, frauds in settlements are likely to be aspects
arising out of later, after-the-fact, investigations. For that reason, a full
discussion of fraud must await the judgments of hindsight in whatever
climate of opinion then exists. At present, based on facts already uncovered, it can only be said that few, if any, termination settlements have
been tainted with actual fraud. None as yet has been turned up in the
Chicago Ordnance District, and apparently this condition is representative. The Director of Contract Settlements on October ii, 1945, stated
publicly that: "The fact is that, except for a few small borderline cases,
weeded out by the contracting agencies, shyster claims just have not
existed."
This is not to be construed, however, as meaning that subsequent appraisals of settlements will give contracting agencies a clean record. Already legislative investigating groups and the General Accounting Office
are probing into closed terminations. In the Chicago Ordnance District
alone an average day finds five representatives of the General Accounting
Office reviewing settlement files. As was the case after World War I, these
investigations probably will turn up very few situations involving actual
fraud. 78 But who can predict whether the reviewers, following the precedent after World War I, will shout that the contracting agencies made
hasty settlements involving unconscionable waste of public funds? 79
7SFor a summary of developments at the end of the last War, see Gromfine and Edwards,
Terminations after World War I, io Law and Contemporary Problems 563, at 588 ('944).
79Perhaps a glimpse into the future and an indication of the ease with which wartime liberality may be confused with illegality is provided by the following excerpts from Hearings before
Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee of the Judiciary on H. R. 4789 and S.1718, 7 8th
Cong., 2d Sess., at i98, 2o9 and 21o:
"Mr. Warren. [Comptroller General] Well, the whole question is one of such magnitude.
There have been so many illegal approvals made under these [cost-plus-a-fixed-fee] contracts,
and there has been such laxity on the part of contracting officers, aided and abetted by those
in authority in the departments. That is why I say that there should be some final check.
"Mr. Bates. You made incriminating statements about the efforts to have these payments
made illegally. You followed that up by making the further statement that the tragedy of all
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Though such attacks will be irritating to termination officials and may be
embarrassing to contractors, the Contract Settlement Act provides that
settlements shall be "final and conclusive except ....for fraud." Regardless of its liberality, a criticized settlement apparently can be upset
through court action only upon presentation of evidence that it was induced by or tainted with fraud.
To the extent this analysis serves to focus attention on generally unnoticed aspects of termination procedures it may assist in avoiding or
disposing of the most common loose ends in settlements. While a number
of the ramifications have been explored, the passage of time alone will
completely reveal the gamut of reserved problems, ancillary negotiations,
and time-consuming controversies which will follow in the wake of speedy
termination settlements.
this is that apparently it is something that nobody cares anything about. Do you mean to intimate that high-ranking officials in the Government service, having charge of these administrative orders, care nothing about these illegal acts?
"Mr. Warren. Oh now, I am afraid you are getting me wrong.
"Mr. Bates. You say there is apparently nobody who cares about the waste, illegal expenditures, and approval of bills, and that you are met with a shrug of the shoulders. What other
intimations do you want to leave with the committee?
"Mr. Warren. Frankly, I do not know if anybody cares anything about it.
"Mr. Bates. Then, they are satisfied with corruption and waste?
"Mr. Warren. No; I would not and do not say corruption.
"Mr. Bates. Illegal payments?
"Mr. Warren. I said extravagance and waste.
"Mr. Bates. And illegal payments?
"Mr. Warren. Extreme liberality."

